http://www.theglobalist.com/StoryId.aspx?StoryId=6737
| U.S. Covert Action in Waziristan (Part I) |
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| By Akbar Ahmed | Wednesday, January 23, 2008 |
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The global spotlight is on Waziristan. Osama bin Laden is said to be there, as well as a new generation of Al Qaeda leaders. Worried about the destabilizing effect of Al Qaeda, the U.S. government wants the CIA to conduct more aggressive operations there. American University Professor Akbar Ahmed, a former civil service administrator once in charge of Waziristan, told The Globalist what the United States can expect.
How do you view the U.S. plan to step up its covert activities in Waziristan?
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Akbar Ahmed (AA): I hear about plans for U.S. air strikes and special operations and I am speechless. Hasn't the Bush Administration learned anything from history? Don't U.S. policymakers read anything at all? It seems they don't have any memory at all.
What should be the U.S. goal in Waziristan?
AA: The key for the United States in dealing with Waziristan is to work through the government of Pakistan to pacify or calm the tribes, get hold of Osama, if indeed he is there, and to make the tribes respond positively to them. The Pakistani government hasn't succeeded in that.
What makes this situation so tricky?
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AA: The people of Waziristan feel that they are the toughest, the noblest, the bravest of the very brave and noble people, the Pashtuns. Their self esteem is very high. They are not intimidated by anyone.
Throughout history, Waziristan has been invaded by empire after empire, and was never subjugated. With that history in mind, the Wazir and Mahsud tribes are very confident.
What is the legacy of American involvement there?
AA: After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the tribal peoples and the peoples of the region — not just the tribal peoples — thought the United States and the Americans were fast friends; and they, together with the Americans, faced a common foe that was the Soviet Union.
They are simple people. They saw Americans as god-fearing — and the Soviets as godless. And they saw the Soviet Union as a bully, a superpower that had charged into Afghanistan and was raping, looting and killing people.
Remember, these people have a great sense of local democracy and fair play. They felt that this invasion had to be resisted. So the tribal areas were enthusiastically sympathetic to the Afghans — not just because they are ethnically akin to the Afghans. In the 1980s, the Americans were popular with the local people.
Did you feel that U.S. intelligence officials at the time understood the people and culture of Waziristan?
AA: Not really. The area was off limits to them and they had no access. It remained a mystery.
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What reputation did the CIA and Americans have in Waziristan after the Soviets were expelled?
AA: Initially, Americans had a good reputation. After all, it was because of the Americans, especially the CIA, that the Afghans won the war in Afghanistan. The CIA, working with the Pakistani intelligence, was able to provide weapons to the Afghans and especially the "Stingers" to shoot down the Soviet helicopters. Afghans remember that Ronald Reagan had called them 'freedom fighters.'
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But not long afterwards, Afghans looked at their land and said, 'My god, look at the devastation, we are destroyed, our homes are destroyed. One-fourth of our people have lost a limb or a leg because of the Soviet's brutalities. Our homes have been uprooted; there is starvation in parts of Afghanistan.' And they thought, 'our American friends will help us.'
But the Americans just walked away. That was the fatal error. When the United States walked away they left a vacuum. The warlords came back, along with local rivalries — and this time the king of Afghanistan was no longer there to act as a unifying force. It was just an implosion of society. In that vacuum, we saw the emergence of the Taliban. In that anarchy and chaos, emerged Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda and the stage was set for 9/11.
The Globalist: How did you personally come to work in Waziristan?
Akbar Ahmed: In the 1960s, I took the exam for and entered the CSP, the Civil Service of Pakistan. This was the elite service, and members of CSP were posted as political agents in the tribal areas. As assistant commissioners, CSP officers found themselves quickly — at the age of 25, in my case — in charge of several million people. The assistant commissioner was in charge of law and order, revenue and the judicial system.
The administration was like a triangle and the political agent was at the top. This was an old colonial structure from the British days and had many critics, but it was, by and large, better than anything else that Pakistan or the region could offer.
The Globalist: What was your first reaction when you were told you were going to Waziristan?
AA: I was thrilled. Waziristan was considered the plum appointment of British India and the most experienced and finest officers served here. It was considered one of the most dangerous and glamorous jobs in the British Empire. The South Waziristan Agency is a beautiful district — high mountains, deep ravines, forests and isolated valleys. Why was it considered so prestigious? Because it was strategically and politically one of the most important areas of South Asia. It housed the two toughest of the Pashtun tribes, the Wazir and the Mahsud. They were tough, politically sharp and proud tribes.
The tribes function on the basis of what is called the Code of the Pashtuns, the Pashtunwali. One of the features of the code is respect or honor. You must respect their code of honor. And one way to respect their code of honor is to respect their culture and their traditions.
These are tribal people. They are proud and ancient people. They can be difficult. They will argue every point for hours and hours and hours.
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The Globalist: It is often said that the people of Waziristan have historically failed to modernize. Is this a fact or myth?
AA: For Pakistani officers it posed a challenge because of the widespread poverty and lack of educational and health facilities. However the people of Waziristan living in Karachi are as modern as you and me. But back home in their own region, they preserve their own custom and tradition. It is a conscious choice—and has nothing to do with "barbarians living in caves." They opted for preserving their identity and a culture. They said this preserves our freedom. That's what they treasured above all. They said, "We have seen what you have done to Pakistan, what modernization means to Pakistan — corrupt police, corrupt revenue officials, corrupt politicians.' So they said, 'We have seen all this. What are you going to give us that is different? Why do you want to modernize us? Leave us alone.'
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The Globalist: If democracy is about self-governance, do the Waziris have democracy?
AA: Yes, even if it is a local variety. To them, the most effective system is the jirga, the council of elders. If there is any major problem, the council of elders meets. It represents all sections of the tribe and decides on the course of action. It can be very effective.
Let's say we are part of a jirga, and Person A has had a fight with Person B over a piece of property and there's a problem and we have to decide who this belongs to. The jirga decides it's Person A's and declares that if Person B does not hand it over, the entire tribe will make sure that he hands it over. It's rough and ready, but effective.
The Globalist: How was political power in Waziristan historically organized?
AA: In Waziristan, historically, there are three sources of power: the government's political agent, the religious figure and the tribal chief.
What has happened after 9/11 is that, thanks to the U.S. strategy of choosing a strictly military approach, the political agent has been sidelined and the Pakistan army now runs all affairs. Musharraf abolished the administrative structure that had prevailed until recent times. A vacuum has therefore formed at the district or agency level of administration throughout Pakistan.
An army officer is not trained to run the civil administration. He is trained to be part of a modern army, not to deal with an agency containing different tribes and cultures. He will therefore make the same mistakes as any other foreigner. To make matters worse even the tribal elders and chiefs were marginalized after 9/11. That meant both the political agent and tribal chief were no longer functional.
Into that vacuum steps the religious figure and he becomes a dominant player in the area. His role is now exaggerated and expanded. Because of post 9/11 politics the local religious figures are easily identified as a local variety of Taliban.
The religious figure then says, 'Any chief talking to the army will have his head cut off.' They begin to impose their version of Islam because there is no counter balancing force of either the civil administration or the tribal chiefs. And they become known as the local Taliban. So what you are seeing in both North and South Waziristan is indeed what you read in the press — Taliban, Taliban. It is those guys who have taken over and they are really running things now. This is the classic case of a society that is no longer either in balance or harmony.
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The Globalist: So would say that the most effective strategy for stability is to restore those pillars?
AA: Yes, it is to restore those pillars, restore the old practices. Currently, there is no communication, which involves respect and understanding, dignity and knowing the code of honor. President Musharraf, under U.S. pressure, has sent the army in three times. Each time he has been humiliated – three hundred soldiers surrendered to the Mashsud a few weeks ago and they lost the Sararogha Fort to the Mahsud a few days ago. The only relationship today with the tribal peoples is through the missile and the bomb .
The Globalist: From your experiences with the people of Waziristan, can the issues that occur in the tribal areas ever be pacified? And could you answer both as a diplomat —and as an anthropologist?
AA: The role of the political agent was defined as part-ambassador and part-governor. Speaking as a diplomat, Waziristan can be pacified and resolved through the code of honor, through understanding, through respect. As an anthropologist, I would say that it will not be easy until there is a proper understanding of society, of the chiefs, of the religious clerics, of what the young want. Remember there is a young generation. The young want change, they want a place in the sun, all this has to be recognized and only anthropologists give you that insight into society.
The Globalist: So, the most effective strategy is careful administration and treating everyone fairly?
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AA: Yes, but unfortunately — and perhaps tragically — the odds aren't good because the Americans, who seem to be on the war path if newspaper reports are to be taken seriously, have no idea of this type of administration. It is a colonial administration and Americans are not a very colonial people. The Americans are used to a mayor who is elected for a fixed period.
In Waziristan, when I was the political agent, I was accountable to no one, except for my own reputation. That is not a very acceptable concept in the West. A 21st century solution has therefore to be found which is informed by the past in which diplomacy and a shrewd understanding of the nature of tribal society often averted death and destruction while meeting the objective at hand.
| The U.S. in Waziristan: Learning from the Past |
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| By Akbar Ahmed | Friday, January 25, 2008 |
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Worried that Al Qaeda may be trying to destabilize the province of Waziristan, the U.S. government is proposing to expand the authority of the CIA to conduct more aggressive operations in the region. In part three of this Globalist Interview, American University Professor Akbar Ahmed explains why U.S. policies in the Muslim world have failed, and what the United States should do in the future.
AA: Bernard Lewis, who under the current administration is viewed as the authority on Islam, believes Muslims need to be treated with force. But that policy has been a failure, an unmitigated disaster.
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This policy has been a disaster in Iraq, a disaster in Afghanistan — and now the U.S. government is thinking of implementing the same disaster in Waziristan. Waziristan is not Iraq. It was not ruled by a cruel dictator for 30 years. Not only that, Waziristan has never been ruled in history.
What's the logic there? Implementing a failed policy in Waziristan will simply confirm the bankruptcy of vision and wisdom. Successful foreign policy is based on sophistication, intelligence and diplomacy. The current U.S. foreign policy in the examples above is based on the twin pillars of arrogance and ignorance. One is bad enough, but you really can't have both. If it were based on arrogance, but with a lot of knowledge, it would have still worked. But you cannot combine arrogance and ignorance — and then hope to succeed.
The Globalist: What advice do you have for the U.S. government?
AA: I would say that the United States should be very cautious — and should send its finest diplomats to have good relations with the tribal chiefs, through jirgas. They should meet them, show them respect, listen to them.
The United States needs to realize that it cannot make the mistake, whatever it does, of sending in troops, because that will do two things: It will consolidate all the tribes against the United States — and also push even those wavering into the local Taliban camp. The local Taliban are already dominating the tribal areas — and now, they are spilling into the settled districts of Pakistan.
Action in the tribal areas will also inflame all of Pakistan. Even those who are seen to be pro-American, like President Musharraf, have warned against any U.S. military action in Pakistan.
The Globalist: What else?
AA: That is enough of a tragedy. The United States as a superpower must succeed in its stated mission of spreading human rights, democracy and civil liberties. It will only do so if it changes its strategy.
Let me tell you a story about that part of the world which will help get my point across if we can draw some principles from it. Let's travel back in time. Alexander the Great crossed into India in triumph. He had defeated the Persians and the Central Asian tribes. In India, he fought King Porus.
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It was one of the toughest battles Alexander had ever fought. Finally, he defeated King Porus, and the king was brought in front of him in chains.
Alexander's aides suggested that Alexander punish King Porus for all the men they lost. Alexander asked King Porus, 'How would you like to be treated?' King Porus replied, 'Like a King.' Alexander liked the answer and said, 'So you shall'.
Alexander then appointed King Porus as a king of his empire. Alexander told King Porus that he would have the same authority in that region as Alexander himself did, and that he would represent him. Needless to say, the king became Alexander's strongest ally overnight.
That's how smart operators act in the real world. This is brilliant administration of foreign lands. Compare that to the U.S. record in Iraq. The United States has spent hundreds of billions of dollars, it has lost 4,000 soldiers and the wars have resulted in the deaths of anywhere between half a million to one million local people.
What is the result? How many people love Americans for it?
The policies in Iraq and Afghanistan have been a failure and going into Waziristan would be an extension of that failure. It would be the "last gasp" of those policies, if you will. My prediction would be that the tribes of Waziristan, the Wazir and the Mahsud, would not fight openly. That is not their strategy.
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Take the example of the Pashtuns in Afghanistan after the American led invasion. The Pashtun responded with their classic strategy by abandoning Kabul and taking to the mountains and waiting to strike at the time and place of their choosing. The Americans thought Kabul had fallen and the war was over. For the Taliban, this was just when the battle was starting.
Today the Taliban are stronger than they have ever been in eastern Afghanistan and they now have areas of influence across the border in Pakistan.
The Globalist: That is similar to the insurgency in Iraq, correct?
AA: In principle yes. In Waziristan tribal warriors will wait until the time is right, the season is right, until their sons can fight and then they will come back. They may blow up things or take hostages. They may strike in Karachi or hit the American consulate in Islamabad. They are not going to fight the American battle. They are going to fight their own battle.
Already commentators are pointing fingers to Waziristan at the murder and mayhem recently in Lahore and Peshawar. We now hear statements about the connection between Benazir's assassins and Waziristan.
The Globalist: And looking to the future?
AA: Washington has to look at morality but also ask 'What is practical?' 'Is it working or is it not working?' One great thing I do respect about Americans is that they are pragmatic. If something does not work, they change it.
It is in their interest to help Pakistan to plan a strategy for Waziristan which is holistic and long-term and one which will emphasize education and development.
Americans will discover that they can win friends and influence people at a fraction of the cost of throwing bombs and missiles at them. Too much is at stake in Waziristan because of its importance in the region for a continuation of policies based in arrogance and ignorance.
Successful foreign policy is based on sophistication, intelligence and diplomacy. The current U.S. foreign policy is based on the twin pillars of arrogance and ignorance. - AA
Editors Note: This interview was conducted on January 6, 2008 by Nathan Richter as part of the St. Andrew's American Century Oral History Project.
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