Tuesday, December 09, 2008

Revealed: home of Mumbai's gunman in Pakistan village

Saeed Shah
The Observer, Sunday December 7 2008

The little house was certainly that of a poor family, with a courtyard to one side and a small cart propped up in one corner. The old man and middle-aged woman who answered the door were not the owners. No, they insisted, the owners were away.

'They've gone to a wedding,' said the old man, identifying himself as Sultan. He was, he said, Amir's father-in-law. So, that would make him Ajmal's grandfather? At last, it seemed, this was the right place.

It had taken days to get to Faridkot, a small, dirt-poor village in Pakistan's Punjab province. More than a week after the arrest of the only Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorist taken alive during the terror strike on Mumbai, so little was still known about him. His name, for instance. Was he Mohammed Amin Kasab, Azam Amir Kasav? Or was he Mohammed Ajmal Amir? The name Kasai in fact means he would hail from a butcher community - that would be his caste. But it was recorded as Kasav, then later Kasab. The discrepancies reportedly stemmed from the fact that the Mumbai police officers who first questioned him were Marathi speakers and unable to communicate with the south Punjab resident in anything other than Hindi patois.

And where exactly was he from? Faridkot is what he told his interrogators, but this is a common village name. There were four candidates in the Punjab region.

Days of trying to establish which was the right one had led to a Faridkot near the Indian border, outside a town called Depalpur. The nearest city was Okara. It seemed to fit. And it was at this Faridkot that Ajmal's father was believed to live.

Initially villagers were unhelpful. No, said those approached, there was no one known here of that name. Even shown a photograph of Ajmal taken during the Mumbai siege, all swore they did not recognise him. The mayor was clear. 'There is a man who came to see me called Amir Kasab, who was worried,' said Ghulam Mustafa Wattoo. 'He told me that the Ajmal on the news was not his boy. That boy's gone away to work. There's no extremist network here.'

Was this another dead end?

As the villagers were questioned, the confusions appeared to multiply. Finally the name Mohammed Ajmal Amir, son of Mohammed Amir Iman, who ran a food stall, emerged.

At other Faridkots, including one near the town of Khanewal, villagers had been friendly and helpful, proffering tea as they shook their heads. 'No. Not from here,' they said. For a while, it appeared that this Faridkot would also prove a wasted journey. The mayor said there had been no local police investigation, suggesting that the authorities did not view this place with suspicion. But, over time, inconsistencies in the villagers' accounts heightened suspicion that this was the place. 'He [Amir] has lived here for a few years,' said one villager, Mohammad Taj. 'He has three sons and three daughters.'

Noor Ahmed, a local farmer, said: 'Amir had a stall he pushed around, sometimes here, sometimes elsewhere. He was a meek man, he wasn't particularly religious. He just made ends meet and didn't quarrel with anyone.'

Still the picture was confusing. While sometimes confirming that Amir did live in the village, and had a son called Ajmal, on other occasions locals claimed to know nothing.

Finally one villager confirmed what was going on: 'You're being given misinformation. We've all known from the first day [of the news of the terrorist attack] that it was him, Ajmal Amir Kasab. His mother started crying when she saw his picture on the television.'

Attempts to meet Amir, the father, however, were not to be successful. Villagers eventually told us that he and his wife, Noor, had been mysteriously spirited away earlier in the week.

'Ajmal used to go to Lahore for work, as a labourer,' continued the villager who feared being named. 'He's been away for maybe four years. When he came back once a year, he would say things like, "We are going to free Kashmir."'

Wresting the whole of Kashmir from Indian rule is Lashkar-e-Taiba's aim. Ajmal had little education, according to locals. But it is still unclear whether he was radicalised in the village or once he had left to work elsewhere.

It is said that from the age of 13 he was shuttled between his parents' house and that of a brother in Lahore. If he did indeed speak fluent English, as claimed in Indian press reports, he would have had to have learnt that after he left the village.

But the villager who turned whistleblower said that local religious clerics were brainwashing youths in the area and that Lashkar-e-Taiba's founder, Hafiz Sayeed, had visited nearby Depalpur, where there were 'hundreds' of supporters. There was a Lashkar-e-Taiba office in Depalpur, but that had been hurriedly closed in the past few days. The Lashkar-e-Taiba newspaper is distributed in Depalpur and Faridkot. Depalpur lies in the south of Punjab province, an economically backward area long known for producing jihadists.

Shown a picture of Ajmal, the villager confirmed that he was the former Faridkot resident, who had last visited the village a couple of months ago at the last festival of Eid.

Some locals have claimed that this Faridkot, and another poor village nearby called Tara Singh, are a recruitment hotbed for Lashkar-e-Taiba, the militant group accused of carrying out the Mumbai attack. On the side of a building, just outside Faridkot, is graffiti that says: 'Go for jihad. Go for jihad. Markaz Dawat ul-Irshad.' MDI is the parent organisation of Lashkar-e-Taiba. In Depalpur, a banner on the side of the main street asks people to devote goatskins to Jamaat ud Dawa, another MDI offshoot.

Tara Singh is home to a radical madrasa - Islamic school - and there is another hardline seminary in nearby Depalpur. The nazim (mayor) of Tara Singh, Rao Zaeem Haider, said: 'There is a religious trend here. Some go for jihad, but not too many.'

Some reports emerging in India suggest that Ajmal may have joined Lashkar -e-Taiba less because of his Islamist convictions but in the hope that the jihad training he would receive would help to further the life of crime upon which he had already embarked. But once inside Lashkar's base, his world-view began to change.

Here, films on India's purported atrocities in Kashmir and heated lectures by fiery preachers led him to believe in Lashkar's cause. It has also been said that, when he was chosen for the Lashkar basic combat training, he performed so well that he was among a group of 32 men selected to undergo advanced training at a camp near Manshera, a course the organisation calls the Duara Khaas.

And finally, it seems, he was among an even smaller group selected for specialised commando and navigation training given to the fedayeen unit selected to attack Mumbai.

The authorities may now attempt to deny that Ajmal's parents live in Faridkot, but, according to some locals, they have been there for some 20 years. But by the end of our visit, a crucial piece of evidence had been gained. The Observer has managed to obtain an electoral roll for Faridkot, which falls under union council number 5, tehsil (area) Depalpur, district Okara. The list of 478 registered voters shows a 'Mohammed Amir', married to Noor Elahi, living in Faridkot. Amir's national identity card number is given as 3530121767339, and Noor's is 3530157035058.

That appears to be the last piece of the jigsaw. A man called Amir and his wife, Noor, do live in Faridkot, official records show. They have a son called Ajmal.

Following our last visit to Faridkot, the mayor, Wattoo, announced via the loudspeaker at the mosque that no one was to speak to any outsiders. By yesterday, Pakistani intelligence officials had descended in force on Faridkot. Locals, speaking by telephone, said a Pakistani TV crew and an American journalist had been roughed up and run out of town. It appeared that the backlash had begun.

The key numbers

10 The number of people India says took part in the attack on Mumbai

1 Survivor from the militant group

2 Indians arrested on Friday in Calcutta suspected of handling phone cards used by the Mumbai attackers. Sources say later that one may be an undercover agent

163 Amended death toll after the massacre. At one point it was believed to have been as high as 195

204 Number of boats India will deploy to prevent future attacks


Wednesday, June 18, 2008

Geopolitical Diary: Implications of Overt U.S. Operations in Pakistan (Stratfor)

 

Strategic Forecasting, Inc.

 

June 17, 2008 | 0123 GMT

 

Geopolitical Diary Graphic — FINAL

Speaking at a joint press conference with British Prime Minister Gordon Brown on Monday, U.S. President George W. Bush expressed support for Afghan President Hamid Karzai's June 15 remarks that Kabul would send forces into Pakistan to prevent the Taliban from using the South Asian country as a launchpad for attacks in Afghanistan. Karzai, who spoke after a major jailbreak in Kandahar in which hundreds of Taliban fighters escaped, specifically mentioned the Waziristan-based Pakistani Taliban chief Baitullah Mehsud and Maulana Fazlullah, the jihadist leader in the district of Swat in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). Pakistani authorities have been negotiating peace agreements with these two jihadist leaders.

It is no coincidence that Bush's and Karzai's statements come just days after a U.S. airstrike against a paramilitary outpost in Pakistan that killed 11 Pakistani soldiers. Afghan forces alone clearly lack the ability to conduct cross-border operations in Pakistan, regardless of Karzai's wishes; Afghanistan can barely secure its own capital. U.S. forces — most likely operating outside the aegis of NATO's International Security Assistance Force — probably would carry out any such move.

Afghanistan and Pakistan are undergoing a shift Stratfor mentioned in May in which the United States is no longer relying on Pakistan to rein in Islamist militants on its side of the border, but is imposing a situation in which it will become the norm for U.S.-led coalition forces to conduct operations openly inside Pakistan. While U.S. special operations forces and CIA teams have been operating covertly in Pakistan essentially since the beginning of the U.S.-jihadist war, this operational tempo appears to have increased to the point that it is poised to become overt. From the U.S. point of view, Pakistan's new civil-military leadership is failing to respond to the jihadist threat aggressively, and there is growing U.S. mistrust of the South Asian country's military and intelligence apparatus.

This perception could help explain the U.S. position that the airstrike on (what Pakistan maintains is) a well-established Pakistani outpost was justified. While U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates called for a joint inquiry into the incident, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Adm. Mike Mullen maintained that U.S. forces took action against hostile forces and that the operation was carried out in keeping with operational protocol. It is no secret that Pakistan's Frontier Corps, whose outpost was hit, is viewed as sympathetic to the Taliban and its allies. This apparently led the United States to take matters into its own hands.

Though it is very difficult to describe the nature of U.S. operations on Pakistani soil, Karzai's comments offer some insight. By threatening not just Mehsud but also Fazlullah, Karzai was hinting that such operations might not be limited to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas but could extend to the NWFP. This leaves the Pakistanis in a very difficult position.

Islamabad could pre-empt the U.S. move by giving Washington exactly what it wants and engaging in a massive action against the militants and their sympathizers within the Pakistani security establishment. Given Pakistan's performance thus far, this is probably not likely, however. But the inability to make such a move is contributing to the growing international perception of Pakistan as a dysfunctional state, and only pushes the United States further toward taking unilateral action.

Routine U.S. raids on Pakistani soil could lead to clashes not only with militants but also with local tribesmen and others who might not support the Taliban. This very well could create a major uprising in Pakistan, with a strong nationalist reaction from a population that already harbors highly anti-American sentiments. Worse, such raids could create fissures and possibly even fractures with the Pakistani army. This would be especially true if Pakistani troops end up clashing with U.S. forces — something certainly not impossible, considering the deteriorating situation in Pakistan.

Rifts within its army would greatly destabilize the Pakistani state. The military is the only robust institution in Pakistan, and is the cornerstone of whatever stability remains in the South Asian country. But the recent turn of events means Islamabad must choose between confrontation with the United States and confrontation with the jihadists.

 

 

© Copyright 2008 Strategic Forecasting Inc. All rights reserved

Monday, June 16, 2008

Zardari Outwits Opponents with a Masterstroke by Zamir Sheikh, The Nation

By Zamir Sheikh: Chaudhry Aitzaz Ahsan, the estranged senior PPP leader and vanguard of Pakistan's Lawyers Movement for the lost cause of restoration of judiciary has failed to see the master stroke played by his party Co-Chairperson Asif Ali Zardari, who, emerged as a master tactician at the end of the lawyers march to Islamabad.

The much trumpeted long march became a show of the right wing politicians and political parties led by Jamaat-e-Islami Chief Qazi Hussain Ahmed and his sidekick Imran Khan, who tried to hijack the entire judicial movement and turned it into an anti PPP, anti Parliament drive after boycotting February 18 elections.

Zardari played his cards well when he gave free hand to his coalition partner Mian Nawaz Sharif and the lawyers to take out the long march and even offered them food and other necessary facilities when the huge crowd of lawyers supported by political activists converged a short distance from the front of the Parliament building.

His party's decision to increase the numbers of Supreme Court judges to 29 in the now under debate finance bill was an intelligent move that almost pricked the bubble of agitation policies of his opponent who are bent upon tarnishing his democratic credentials. He has already released the salaries for the sacked judges to show his sincerity to the cause of reinstating the judged but through a constitutional package.

PPP Co-Chairman's non- resistance attitude to the march took away the wind out of the political sail of the APDM who was expecting road blocks and road bumps to the marchers from the government side which would have given bad name to the PPP led government at Islamabad.

The brinkmanship politics of APDM which is aimed at forcing fresh election at the earliest was stymied by the master stroke of Zardari.

The major stake holder of APDM, Nawaz Sharif is aware that the PPP without Benazir Bhutto would be like a sacrificial lamb before his lion that is why he is in a hurry to cash all the advantages and bring the situation to such a pass that there is no alternate except going back to the people for a new mandate.

Born again politician, Zardari with a political acumen not seen before in this country, is aware of the difficulties that he and his party would face if they are thrown again into the election arena without delivering any thing.

Analysts, who are closely monitoring the day-to-day political scenario, are of the view that time is of essence for Zardari and there is no better option for him to buy time then to extend the crucial issue of restoration of judiciary.

He and his partners have intelligently and wisely played their cards in the judicial movement by introducing the judicial reformation bill in the parliament. This will buy him more than enough time and at the same time exacerbate the worries of Nawaz Sharif and his other political opponents who in desperation would make decisions that will further expose them. Analysts had rightly expressed their fear that the lawyers movement may land in the hands of extremist elements and the entire cause would be defeated and may become a tool in the hands of those elements who are fighting in the Northern areas of the country.

This fear was reflected in the speech of former ISI Chief delivered by the thorough bred, Jihadi, Lt Gen (R) Hamid Gul, who set aside the cause of the lawyers and loudly spoke about starting a jihad. He openly said that the nation is ready to wage a jihad against the foreign forces.

His public declaration may have shocked the supporters of the lawyers' movement because it is not a political campaign.

The presence of a number of retired generals, who while in uniform trampled over the constitution, human rights and democratic forces under their boots in the past, were now with the lawyers supporting their campaign wearing the cloak of civil society.

However, for those who had seen and experienced history over the last 60 years was difficult to swallow the idea of former generals supporting a democratic cause.

It is like the wolf of Little Red Riding Hood story in which the carnivorous animal sleeping in the bed camouflaging himself as a Granny waiting for his kill.

Thursday, June 12, 2008

Pakistan Fury at Deadly US Strike, BBC

Pakistani tribesman from Mohmand tribal region, injured in a clash between Afghan forces and Taliban militants (11.06.08)
Details of the clashes that sparked the apparent air strike remain unclear

Pakistan's Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani has condemned an air strike by Afghanistan-based US forces that Islamabad says killed 11 of its troops.

The incident took place inside Pakistan, near the border with Afghanistan.

The US military confirmed it had used artillery and air strikes after coming under fire from "anti-Afghan" forces.

The incident comes as relations between the US and Pakistan militaries have been hit by mounting tensions.

The soldiers' deaths occurred overnight at a border post in the mountainous Gora Prai region in Mohmand, one of Pakistan's tribal areas, across the border from Afghanistan's Kunar province.

Eight Taleban militants were also killed in the clashes, a Taleban spokesman said.

'Cowardly act'

If the 11 deaths are confirmed, it would be the worst incident of its kind since US and Nato-led forces began fighting militants in Afghanistan in 2001.

Prime Minister Gilani condemned the deaths, telling parliament: "We will take a stand for the sake of this country's sovereignty, for the sake of its dignity and self-respect".

"We do not allow our territory to be used. We completely condemn this, and will take it up through the foreign office."

Pakistan's military called it a "completely unprovoked and cowardly act".

Pakistan and Afghanistan map

The US military said in a statement that coalition troops had come under fire from "anti-Afghan forces" in a wooded area near the Pakistan border.

The statement said artillery and air strikes had been co-ordinated with Pakistan, but that the incident was being investigated.

A spokesman for a pro-Taleban militant group in Pakistan said it had launched an attack on US and Afghan army troops trying to set up a border control post.

"We launched an attack on them from several sides and caused serious harm - and then the US and Nato forces began a series of air strikes," said the spokesman, Maulvi Umar.

Lawless border

There is increasing anger in Pakistan at US strikes on its territory which have killed more than 50 people this year, says the BBC's Barbara Plett in Islamabad.

Both US forces and Nato-led coalition forces are operating in Afghanistan, with Nato focused mainly on peacekeeping and reconstruction and the US troops working more directly to combat militant activity.

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Funerals have been held for the 11 soldiers who died

Taleban fighters have a strong presence in the border areas of the tribal districts and local administrators have little power there, although security forces keep a presence on the border.

There is rising frustration among the Afghans and foreign troops at Pakistani efforts to negotiate peace deals with pro-Taleban militants on its side of the border.

Afghan and US-led forces accuse Islamabad of not doing enough to deny Taleban militants a hiding place in Pakistan's tribal areas and to stop them from infiltrating the border into Afghanistan.

They are worried that the Pakistan government's recent peace talks with the militants there will only give the Taleban more room for manoeuvre.

Pakistan denies the accusations, saying it has lost about 1,000 soldiers fighting militants in the tribal border areas.


Monday, June 02, 2008

"The Lawyers' Crusade" from New York Times


"
Ahsan is almost recklessly outspoken about P.P.P. leaders, even though
they are his own political patrons. He speaks admiringly of Benazir
Bhutto's courage and steadfastness but also points out with disdain
that she viewed herself as the P.P.P.'s "life chairperson." And he
does not bother to conceal his dim view of Zardari. In the car, as we
drove back through the night to Lahore, I asked him how many of the
allegations of corruption he believed were justified. "Most of them,"
Ahsan said, after a moment's reflection. "The type of expenses that
she had and he has are not from sources of income that can be lawfully
explained and accounted for."


Sunday, May 18, 2008

In Pakistan, a dark trade comes to light



 
SEX IN DEPTH

In Pakistan, a dark trade comes to light

By William Sparrow

BANGKOK - Prostitution in the Islamic nation of Pakistan, once relegated to dark alleys and small red-light districts, is now seeping into many neighborhoods of country's urban centers. Reports indicate that since the period of civilian rule ended in 1977, times have changed and now the sex industry is bustling.

Early military governments and religious groups sought to reform areas like the famous "Taxali Gate" district of Lahore by displacing prostitutes and their families in an effort to "reinvent" the neighborhood.

While displacing the prostitutes might have temporarily made the once small red-light district a better neighborhood for a time, it did little to stop the now dispersed prostitutes from plying their trade. Reforming a neighborhood, instead of offering education and alternative opportunities, appears to be at the core of early failures to curb the nascent sex industry. This mistake would become a prophetic error as now the tendrils of the sex trade have become omnipresent in cities like Islamabad, Rawalpindi, Karachi and Lahore, not to mention towns, villages and rural outposts.

An aid worker for an Islamabad-based non-governmental organization (NGO) recently related a story: quickly after his arrival in the capital, he realized the house next to his own was a Chinese brothel. The Chinese ability to "franchise" the commercial sex industry by providing down-trodden Chinese women throughout Asia, North America and Europe would be admirable in a business sense if it were not for the atrocities - human trafficking, sexual slavery and exploitation - which cloud its practice.

Chinese bordellos, often operating as "massage parlors" or beauty salons, are across Pakistan, even spread even to war-torn and restive locations such as the Afghan capital Kabul. Chinese in the sex industry have developed a cunning ability to recognize areas where the demand for sex far outstrips the supply.

The NGO worker said that after months of living adjacent to the brothel things were shaken up - literally. One evening a drunk Pakistani drove his car into the brothel. Later the driver told authorities the ramming was a protest by a devout Muslim against the debauchery of the house and its inhabitants. The NGO worker, however, had seen the same car parked peacefully outside the house the night before.

The local sex industry comprised of Pakistani prostitutes has also grown in recent years. One can easily find videos on YouTube that show unabashed red-light areas of Lahore. The videos display house after house with colorfully lit entranceways always with a mamasan and at least one Pakistani woman in traditional dress. The women are available for in-house services for as little as 400 rupees (US$6) to take-away prices ranging 1,000 to 2,000 rupees. These districts are mostly for locals, but foreigners can indulge at higher prices.

Foreigners in Pakistan have no trouble finding companionship and may receive rates similar to locals in downtrodden districts. More upscale areas like Lahore's Heera Mundi, or "Diamond Market", cater to well-heeled locals and foreigners. At these places prettier, younger girls push their services for 5,000 to 10,000 rupees for an all-night visit, and the most exceptional can command 20,000 to 40,000 rupees for just short time.

Rumors abound online that female TV stars and actresses can be hired for sex. "You can get film stars for 50,000 to 100,000 rupees but you need good contacts for that," one blogger wrote after a trip to Lahore.

"The Lahore, Karachi and Rawalpindi sex scenes are totally changing and it's easier and easier to get a girl for [sex]," another blogger wrote. "Most of the hotels provide you the girls upon request." Bloggers also reported that it is easy to find girls prowling the streets after 6 pm, and foreigners can find young women hanging out near Western franchises like McDonald's and KFC. Such women, the bloggers claim, can lead the customer to a nearby short-time accommodation.

Short-time hotels offering hourly rates can be found all over major cities, underscoring the profits being reaped by the sex industry.

Pakistan can also accommodate the gay community with prostitution. Unfortunately, this has also given rise to child prostitution.

A Pakistani blogger wrote, "We [ethnic] Pathans are very fond of boys. [In Pakistan] the wives are only [had sex with] once or twice a year. There are lot of gay brothels in Peshawar - the famous among them is at Ramdas Bazaar. [One can] go to any Afghan restaurant and find young waiters selling sex."

As in many societies, access to technology, the Internet and mobile phones has only facilitated the sex trade in Pakistan. "Matchmaking" websites serve the male clientele, while providing marketing for prostitutes.

The root causes of prostitution in Pakistan are poverty and a dearth of opportunities. Widows find themselves on the streets with mouths to feed, and for many prostitution offers a quick fix. A local Pakistani prostitute can earn 2,000 to 3,000 rupees per day compared to the average monthly income of 2,500 rupees.

Forced prostitution is not rare. Women in hard times are often exploited and pushed into prostitution. Sandra (not her real name), said that after the death of her father she was left alone; friends and relatives deserted her after the grieving period. As a middle-class, educated woman she was surprised to find herself forced into prostitution from her office job.

"My boss initially spoiled me at first," she told Khaleej Times. "[But] now I am in [the sex industry]." Sandra first thought her boss was being gracious, but quickly learned he was grooming her for sex for his own pleasure, and then acting as her pimp.

Many of Pakistan's contemporary sexual mores may have evolved from traditional practices. For example, the polygamy permitted in Muslim society stemmed from the need for larger family units, the better to support familial ties and tend for widows. Until such ancient customs are updated, women such as Sandra will continue to be bought and sold.

It's time for Pakistan to admit that prostitution is doing a roaring trade within its borders, and will continue to prosper until it is addressed in a modern manner. Let us hope that the people and government of this proud Muslim country will stop pretending the problem simply isn't there.

William Sparrow has been an occasional contributor to Asia Times Online and now joins Asia Times Online with a weekly column. Sparrow is editor in chief of Asian Sex Gazette and has reported on sex in Asia for over five years. To contact him send question or comments to Letters@atimes.com.

(Copyright 2008 Asia Times Online Ltd.)

Haqqani Back in D.C., Where Everybody Knows His Name by Robin Wright, Washington Post


By Robin Wright
Washington Post Staff Writer
Friday, May 16, 2008; A17

Most ambassadors gain real influence only after years of working Washington's corridors of power -- and often only with the help of expensive lobbying firms. But Husain Haqqani, the ambassador-designate from Pakistan, already knows almost everyone who counts.

"He's one of the guys," said Rep. Howard Berman (D-Calif.), chairman of the House Foreign Relations Committee, who has known Haqqani for more than five years. "I'll always take a call from him." He was one of a half-dozen senior members of Congress who saw Haqqani on short notice during a recent two-day trip to Washington.

As spokesman and political confidant of then-Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, Haqqani became a familiar face at Washington think tanks, on American news programs and on Capitol Hill, where he lobbied, after being exiled in 1999, against the government of President Pervez Musharraf. Now that Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party is back in power, Haqqani has become the public face of Pakistan in Washington.

"It's difficult to be a survivor in the Pakistani political scene, and he's certainly been a survivor," said George Percovich, a former colleague of Haqqani's at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. "Now he's on a first-name basis with so many players in Washington that whatever administration comes next won't matter."

On Capitol Hill, Haqqani's schmoozing skills are often compared to Washington's master politicos. "I sometimes call him Karl Rove -- without the wickedness," a senior congressional staffer said.

"He's a garrulous fellow who's passionate about Pakistan, and there's never a shortage of conversation when he's around. He loves the engagement and loves to be in the middle of politics and bringing the parties together," said Rep. John F. Tierney (D-Mass.), who has also known Haqqani for several years.

When he's not working the State Department or the Hill, Haqqani is trying to influence U.S. thinking with opinion pieces in publications -- they currently fill most of the 19 pages of his bio. "He's a man with a golden tongue who writes well and fast," said Teresita C. Schaffer, a diplomatic colleague of Haqqani's when the two were their nations' top envoys to Sri Lanka.

Haqqani will arrive in Washington later this month as the two countries on the front line of combating terrorism begin to redefine their relationship. Since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, the Bush administration has dealt directly with Musharraf. Now it must work with a fractious coalition government whose agenda is not always in sync with Washington's.

"The new coalition has to show it has an effective approach to the domestic insurgency that is different from Musharraf and not made in Washington. It is inclined to deal with the problem politically, not militarily," said Schaffer, now with the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The new government of Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani favors negotiating with Pakistan's militant groups, "and that has given Washington a bad case of the jitters," Schaffer said.

Pakistan is in turn under pressure from Washington to produce results and a fuller accounting of billions in U.S. aid since 2001, particularly given the rare successes in tracking al-Qaeda operating along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. More than $75 million was withheld this year because of poor accounting, U.S. officials say.

Haqqani's main pitch will be refocusing the approach to battling terrorism. "U.S.-Pakistan relations have been about security. Now it needs to become a strategic partnership," he said. "Pakistan has always felt insecure, in part due to the circumstances since its birth. Pakistan now needs to develop the kind of relationship the United States has with NATO, that they can rely on each other long term."

U.S.-Pakistan negotiations should be as much about market share as security, Haqqani argued. "There can be no success in the war on terrorism unless we can offer jobs, education and health services for our own people," he said. "And that will only happen when Pakistan has markets for its textiles."

At least initially, he may find a receptive audience. "Five years ago, he was arguing that U.S. policy vesting everything in relations with a military dictatorship was a mistake and we'd be better off promoting political pluralism," Berman said. "Lo and behold, we're in that situation now, and I think he can play an important role in widening the level of support for Pakistan and communicating to Pakistanis the issues we consider important."

To accept the job, Haqqani had to commit to an epic commuter marriage. His wife, former CNN and MSNBC producer Farahnaz Ispahani, won a seat in the new parliament. She is the granddaughter of M.A.H. Ispahani, Pakistan's first ambassador to Washington. When Ispahani visits, she will be living in the home on S Street bought by her grandfather and donated as Pakistan's permanent residence.


Sunday, April 20, 2008

The military millionaires who control Pakistan Inc.

by Elliot Wilson

Wednesday, 16th January 2008

Elliot Wilson says Pakistan's economy is dominated by a ruthless business conglomerate that owns everything from factories and bakeries to farmland and golf courses: the army

Sometime in late 2004, Pakistan's all-powerful army made a curious decision. Under mounting pressure from London and Washington to capture Osama bin Laden, believed to be hiding in Baluchistan, Islamabad's fighting forces instead turned their attention to a far more profitable venture: building golf courses.
In itself this wasn't particularly unusual. With 620,000 soldiers, Pakistan boasts the world's seventh-largest standing army, but its senior officers long ago realised the perks to be gained from commercial ventures. Since independence in 1947, the army has steadily intertwined itself into Pakistan's economy: so much so that it's hard to tell where the military stops and any semblance of free-market capitalism begins.
All too often, there is no dividing line. In her 2007 book Military Inc: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy Dr Ayesha Siddiqa exposes the rampant commercialism pervading every aspect of the country's military forces, until recently headed by President Pervaiz Musharraf. Dr Siddiqa, a former researcher with the country's naval forces, estimates the military's net worth at more than £10 billion — roughly four times the total foreign direct investment generated by Islamabad in 2007. She found that the army owns 12 per cent of the country's land, its holdings being mostly fertile soil in the eastern Punjab. Two thirds of that land is in the hands of senior current and former officials, mostly brigadiers, major-generals and generals. The most senior 100 military officials are estimated to be worth, at the very least, £3.5 billion.
Many of the country's largest corporations are also controlled by the military, thanks largely to an opaque network of powerful 'foundations' originally set up to look after the pension needs of army personnel. The largest three — the Fauji, Shaheen and Bahria foundations, controlled by the army, air force and navy respectively — control more than 100 separate commercial entities involved in everything from cement to cereal production. Only nine have ever published partial financial accounts, and all are ultimately controlled by the Ministry of Defence, which oversees all of the military's commercial ventures.
The Fauji foundation, the largest of the lot, is estimated by Siddiqa to be worth several billion pounds. It operates a security force (allowing serving army personnel to double in their spare time as private security agents), an oil terminal and a phosphate joint venture with the Moroccan government. Elsewhere, the Army Welfare Trust — a foundation set up in 1971 to identify potentially profitable ventures for the military — runs one of the country's largest lenders, Askari Commercial Bank, along with an airline, a travel agency and even a stud farm. Then there is the National Logistic Cell, Pakistan's largest shipper and freight transporter (and the country's largest corporation), which builds roads, constructs bridges and stores vast quantities of the country's wheat reserves.
In short, the military's presence is all-pervasive. Bread is supplied by military-owned bakeries, fronted by civilians. Army-controlled banks take deposits and disburse loans. Up to one third of all heavy manufacturing and 7 per cent of private assets are reckoned to be in army hands. As for prime real estate, a major-general can expect to receive on retirement a present of 240 acres of prime farmland, worth on average £550,000, as well an urban real estate plot valued at £700,000.
Unsurprisingly, the military is loath to release details of its commercial operations. The average Pakistani citizen earns just £1,500 a year, making his country poorer than all but 50 of the world's nations. Most of the military's junior officers and other ranks live in squalid tents pitched by the side of main roads, even in the capital Islamabad. Revealing to them that the top brass in their air-conditioned, top-of-the-range Mercedes are worth £35 million each (a few are believed to be dollar billionaires including, it is quietly suggested, Musharraf) would probably create widespread unrest. Little wonder that Dr Siddiqa's book is banned in the country — and that Musharraf was so reluctant to take off his uniform and declare himself a civilian president.
Financial autonomy has also engendered in the military a dangerous sense of entitlement. When any premier or leading politician attempts to limit the army's power, or even emasculate it, they get slapped down. In 1990 Benazir Bhutto, during her first stint as premier, made a concerted attempt to 'secularise' the army, installing non-army personnel at the highest level. Shortly afterwards, her government was forced out. She tried again in May 2006, joining with another former civilian leader, Nawaz Sharif, to issue a Charter of Democracy designed to reduce the economic power of the armed forces. Yet with Bhutto's assassination, the latest move to tame the armed forces has again faltered — a rather convenient situation for the military.
It's hard to imagine any individual or political body summoning up enough power or courage to challenge the army head-on. Each year the military gobbles up a bit more land, diversifies into new markets and industries and steadily consolidates power in the key sectors of agriculture, energy, natural resources, logistics and construction.
On the rare occasions when any constitutional body has stood its ground, the army has given it short shrift. In 2005, the Fauji foundation was asked by the elected parliament why it had sold a sugar mill at a ludicrously low price to senior army personnel. The Ministry of Defence refused to reveal any details of the deal. When the Auditor-General's department questioned why the army was building golf courses — rather than attempting to capture bin Laden — its question was ignored. Yet the Punjab government had that year willingly handed over, for free, 30 acres of prime rural land worth more than £600,000 to the army, which promptly built a driving-range and an 18-hole golf course. Such 'presents' to the military are usually returned with interest, with senior civilian officials often being guaranteed a secure retirement on the board of one or more army-controlled ventures. Craven and submissive attitudes have thoroughly pervaded the political system, which defers to the military at every turn: little wonder that senior officers have so little respect for their civilian peers. Other countries have armies, but Pakistan's army has a country.
Absolute power, of course, corrupts absolutely. It also engenders a sense of invulnerability — that the wielder of the power can get away with anything. This certainly seems to be the case in Pakistan. Land is being requisitioned left, right and centre across the country. In the financial centre of Karachi, the army has built eight petrol stations on land appropriated from the state. In 2004, the Karachi government again willingly gave land worth £35 million to the military, just because they wanted it. These are just two examples among many.
The military has also begun to act in the manner of a feudal landlord. When landless peasants in central Punjab complained in 2001 that the army had changed the status of the land on which they depended for their subsistence (forcing them to pay rent in cash, rather than working the land on a sharecropping basis) the army cracked down, beating many and leaving eight dead. At one point, Dr Siddiqa quotes a naval officer who questions why landless peasants should have any rights in relation to the land they till. 'They do not deserve land just because they are poor,' he says.
It's hard to imagine anyone managing to circumscribe the economic power of Pakistan's army. The military's financial security reinforces its desire to retain control of the state. If full democracy were permitted in Pakistan, it would constitute a threat to the army's throttling power. And since political power in turn creates greater economic opportunities, it's in the interest of the military fraternity to perpetuate it. More political power leads to greater profit, and vice versa. The one factor that could still harm the army is its arrogant, dismissive attitude to its own people. Its flagrant profiteering engenders huge resentment in rural and smaller provinces, where the army is increasingly seen as an invading force rather than a protector. Ultimately, there is only so much abuse that an impoverished and subjugated populace can take before it rises up in protest.

The Spectator, 22 Old Queen Street, London, SW1H 9HP. All Articles and Content Copyright ©2007 by The Spectator (1828) Ltd. All Rights Reserved 

Friday, April 18, 2008

U.S. Lacked a Pakistan Plan, Report Finds, The New York Times

April 18, 2008

U.S. Lacks a Pakistan Plan, Report Finds

WASHINGTON — The Bush administration has failed to develop a government wide plan to combat terrorism in Pakistan's unruly tribal areas, even though top American officials concede that Al Qaeda has regenerated its ability to attack the United States and has established havens in that border region, government auditors said Thursday.

In a searing report, the Government Accountability Office, an investigative arm of Congress, sharply criticized the administration for relying too heavily on Pakistan's military to achieve American counterterrorism goals, while paying only token attention to economic development and improving governance.

Nearly $6 billion of the $10.5 billion in aid that Washington has provided to Pakistan since 2001 has been directed toward combating terrorism in the tribal areas, the report said. But about 96 percent of that aid has gone to reimburse Pakistan for its use of 120,000 troops in counterterrorism missions in that area that have shown little success.

In a rare acknowledgment, senior officials at the United States Embassy in Islamabad told the government auditors that they had received no strategic guidance from Washington on designing, carrying out, financing and monitoring a coordinated American strategy, the report said.

Only in March 2006, after President Pervez Musharraf asked President Bush for help with Pakistan's wide-ranging counter-terrorism plan for the tribal areas, did the American Embassy begin coordinating efforts by the Pentagon, State Department and Agency for International Development for a complementary strategy, the auditors found.

More than two years later, though, that plan to provide nearly $1 billion over four years in economic aid and reconstruction assistance in the tribal areas has not been fully approved in Washington, lacks full financing and faces uncertain support by the newly elected Pakistani government, the report concludes.

The report's findings ignited a sharp exchange Thursday between members of Congress from both parties who commissioned the review and White House officials.

"It is appalling that there is still no comprehensive, inter-agency strategy concerning this critical region, and this lack of foresight is harming U.S. national security," said Representative Howard L. Berman, a California Democrat who is chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Mr. Berman said the committee would hold a hearing on May 7 to investigate the report's conclusions.

Senior administration officials disputed many of the auditors' central findings, and said the administration had mapped out a detailed counterterrorism strategy in coordination with the Pakistani government.

"The United States is dealing with the terrorist threat in Pakistan through a variety of means across the political, economic and security fronts," Gordon D. Johndroe, a White House spokesman, said in a statement. "We devote resources to health, education, economic development, political reform, as well as going after Al Qaeda with the Pakistani security forces."

Mr. Johndroe continued, "This is going to be a long battle against a determined enemy, and I can assure you that the president and his national security advisers focus on this every day and will continue to do what is necessary to protect the American people."

But the government auditors, who reviewed administration policy documents and classified intelligence reports and interviewed American and Pakistani officials, said the administration had failed to meet its own goals to destroy the threat from Al Qaeda and close the militants' safe havens in Pakistan.

Gen. Michael V. Hayden, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, said March 30 that the security situation along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border "presents clear and present danger to Afghanistan, to Pakistan and to the West in general, and to the United States in particular."

Nevertheless, the auditors painted a portrait of the State Department, the Pentagon, the Agency for International Development and other agencies carrying out individual counterterrorism strategies for Pakistan, with little or no formal integration of the plans by the National Security Council and the National Counterterrorism Center.

"As a result, since 2002, the embassy has had no Washington-supported, comprehensive plan to combat terrorists and close the terrorist safe haven in the FATA," the auditors concluded, referring to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan.

Without such an approach, the report found, the United States has had to rely on the Pakistani Army and the Frontier Corps, a paramilitary force recruited from ethnic groups on the border.

State Department officials say that Pakistan has helped to kill or capture hundreds of suspected terrorists, including Qaeda operatives and Taliban leaders, since the Sept. 11 attacks, the report noted. Moreover, Pakistani military operations have resulted in the deaths of more than 1,400 Pakistani security forces, officials told the auditors.

But American Embassy officials told the auditors that an over-reliance on military solutions to the problem stemmed from a lack of a more comprehensive counterterrorism approach.

The report concluded that there have been limited efforts to address the underlying causes of terrorism in the tribal areas, such as providing development assistance and addressing the political needs of a region still governed under administration and legal structures dating from 1901, in the region's colonial period.

In response, the American Embassy has developed a plan in coordination with federal agencies in Washington to provide $956 million in fiscal years 2008 through 2011 for development, security and infrastructure in support of the Pakistani government, the auditors determined.

As of September, the embassy had also planned to spend $187.6 million in fiscal year 2007 money to help develop schools and hospitals in the tribal areas; to train the Frontier Corps, and equip them with night-vision goggles and radios; and to build border surveillance outposts.

Friday, April 11, 2008

The Pakistan Paradox

The New Republic

The Pakistan Paradox by Dennis Ross

President Musharraf and his U.S.-supported anti-terror policies have been roundly rejected by Pakistanis. How can U.S. diplomats get on the right side of history--and ramp up our assault on Al Qaeda?
Post Date Thursday, April 03, 2008







On the day that Pakistan saw a new prime minister sworn into office, one of Pakistan's leading newspapers, The News, led with the headline, "Hands Off Please, Uncle Sam." The article was a response to the arrival of two senior American envoys, Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte and Assistant Secretary Richard Boucher. They were hoping to foster ties to a new government, true, but their more immediate mission was to convince the new prime minister to preserve President Pervez Musharraf's policies of partnering with the U.S. in the war on terror.

One can hardly blame the Bush Administration for being concerned about developments in Pakistan. It is a nuclear-armed country; it is the front in the war on terror; it will largely determine the fate of Afghanistan, particularly as the Taliban has been able to recoup by operating with relative ease across its border; segments of its intelligence and security services have Islamist sympathies; and the leaders who have emerged from the elections, Asif Ali Zardari and Nawaz Sharif, have made it clear that they intend to deal with terror by talking to extremist groups in the tribal border areas, while also opposing American bombing in those areas.

In the last several months, we have seen that President Musharraf has lost the vast majority of the Pakistani public. His declaration of emergency law and disbanding of the Pakistani Supreme Court last fall was the last straw for a public that had already grown disillusioned with Musharraf's effort to hold onto power regardless of the costs to the country. The parliamentary elections in February became a referendum on his rule--and he lost unmistakably. The Bush Administration and the president personally have been seen by Pakistanis, fairly or not, as being more committed to Musharraf than to Pakistan and the rule of law.

To make matters worse, Pakistanis increasingly believe that they are paying the price for our war against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Pakistanis are interpreting the increasing terror attacks in the country as a direct response to the recent uptick in our bombing of Al Qaeda targets in the border areas. All of this means that a negative reaction to the arrival of senior U.S. envoys should not have been unexpected. Pakistanis believe that they are carrying out a democratic coup, sweeping away the illegitimate underpinnings of the Musharraf presidency, and are not about to take kindly to American efforts to shore up Musharraf or preserve his policies.

They want change--not just with Musharraf himself, but also with his policies for dealing with terror. The question for the U.S. is whether we can live with the change, and at the same time, manage it so that Al Qaeda and the Taliban not only don't benefit, but also lose their sanctuary in Pakistan.

 The irony of the Pakistan election is that Musharraf was not the only big loser. So were the religious parties that had dominated the Frontier Province over the last five years. The religious parties were among the most conservative in Pakistan and unmistakably sympathetic to Islamist forces. Rather than opposing Al Qaeda and the Taliban, they seemed emotionally connected to them. Musharraf often appeared to act with the sensibilities of these parties in mind.

Hence another irony: Musharraf, our partner in the war on terror, was not so energetic in going after Al Qaeda and the Taliban in the border areas. On the contrary, he and his intelligence services seemed to turn a blind eye to the Taliban's reconstituting itself, as it recruited new members and planned attacks into Afghanistan from across the border in Pakistan. Repeatedly, Afghani President Hamid Karzai complained of Pakistani complicity with the Taliban along the border. Increasingly, U.S. officials over the last several years have gone to Pakistan to push Musharraf to do more to root out the Taliban and Al Qaeda.

Last year, the U.S. intelligence community concluded that Al Qaeda had largely recovered its strength in no small part because it was able to operate much more freely in the Waziristan region of Pakistan. A 2006 deal Musharraf had struck with the tribes in North and South Waziristan backfired and contributed to the strengthening of both Al Qaeda and the Taliban.

One more irony: The big winner in the elections in the tribal areas was the Awami National Party (A.N.P.), which has long accused Musharraf and the Pakistani intelligence services of duplicity in its dealings with Islamist groups. The A.N.P. opposes talks with Al Qaeda and foreign militants because, as Afrasiab Khattak, the secretary general of the A.N.P., has said, "We don't have a common language with them." But the party does favor an approach that emphasizes dialogue with the local tribes, economic development and assistance to the area, and the use of the police rather than the military (except in limited circumstances) to bring peace to the provinces. If anything, Nawaz Sharif has been more outspoken about how to deal with terror, calling for talking rather than the use of force.

 With these not entirely favorable conditions in mind, how should the U.S. proceed? Deputy Secretary Negroponte was no doubt right when he said before leaving Karachi last week that "Security measures are obviously necessary when one is dealing with irreconcilable elements who want to destroy our very way of life. I don't know see how you can talk with those kinds of people."

But what about the model we have now been using in Anbar province in Iraq? The Sunnis in the "Sons of Iraq" and the "Awakening Councils" have become our partner in fighting Al Qaeda in Iraq. Al Qaeda produced a backlash among the Sunnis and we have seen the benefit of supporting these groups. Is it possible to cultivate a similar realignment in Pakistan? Could the A.N.P. approach be one that we should support in a similar fashion?

One thing is for sure: There has been a change in Pakistan, and it is being driven by those who are emphasizing democratic processes and the rule of law. We should be on the right side of this. What's more, we have little choice. Pakistanis are moving in a direction that we cannot stop but should try to channel. That is common sense and good statecraft.

But as the Pakistanis make their decisions, they should also know that we have interests and stakes and will not be indifferent to what they do. Surely, for their own interests, they don't want those who employ terror and who are responsible for killing Benazir Bhutto to further entrench themselves. Separating the tribal groups from Al Qaeda and the Taliban is a strategy that could work if orchestrated effectively.

To be sure, the new Pakistani leadership might be tempted to cut a deal with Al Qaeda and the Taliban that would see them stop their attacks in Pakistan by permitting them to operate and plan attacks at our expense. We need to prevent that, and we probably can, if we are clear about our interests and needs. We should say that we will help provide financial and other means for their new strategy, assuming it is transparent. We should also repeat what Senator Barack Obama said last summer: If we get actionable intelligence about terror acts being prepared in these provinces of Pakistan and the Pakistanis won't act, we will.

Statecraft involves conditioning attitudes in private even with those who we hope will be our partners. Making clear we will respect Pakistani interests and needs is one part of statecraft; so is making sure there are no illusions about our interests.

Dennis Ross is counselor and Ziegler distinguished fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and author of Statecraft: And How to Restore America's Standing in the World.

Thursday, April 10, 2008

PAKISTAN: Human rights groups denounce burning to death of up to 7 lawyers in Karachi and call for immediate action


FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
April 11, 2008
ALRC-STM-005-2008

A Joint Statement by the Lawyers Rights Watch Canada (LRWC) , the Asian Legal Resource Centre (ALRC) and the Lawyers Without Borders/Canada (LWB/C)

PAKISTAN: Human rights groups denounce burning to death of up to 7 lawyers in Karachi and call for immediate action1


Lawyers Rights Watch Canada (LRWC), the Asian Legal Resource Centre (ALRC) and Lawyers Without Borders/Canada (LWB/C) call on the Government of Pakistan to immediately provide effective protection to Pakistan lawyers and to prevent future and punish past attacks on them.

LRWC, ALRC and LWB/C repeat the call on the new government of Pakistan to act to ensure:

  1. The reinstatement of all judges removed from office by the Provisional Constitution Order No. 1 of 2007, November 3 2007 in accordance with the Murree Declaration; and
  2. The rescission of all laws, including amendments to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (Constitution), purporting to come into force under authority of the Proclamation of Emergency Declaration of November 3, 2007, the Provisional Constitutional Order No. 1 of 2007 and the Oath of Offices (Judges) Order, 2007
  3. Withdrawal of charges laid after November 3/07 against lawyers and others for protesting the imposition of martial law including charges of high treason, sabotage, destroying public property and maintenance of public order.
  4. Strict adherence by Pakistan officials to laws validly in force prior to November 3, 2007 and to applicable international standards protecting the independence of lawyers and judges including those embodied in the UN Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers2 and the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary.3

Background

LRWC, ALRC and LWB/C deplore the death of 11 people in Karachi including the death by burning of 6 people believed to be lawyers. LRWC rejects false accusations against members of the Lawyers Movement and regards all attempts to vilify these lawyers and other social justice activists as a pretext to justify illegal activities: the continuation of the suspension of the Pakistan legal system and extra-legal attacks on and executions of those advocating its return.

Since March 2007 millions of people inspired by thousands of lawyers, have peacefully protested the destruction of the Pakistan legal system by the Musharraf regime and advocated for the restoration of an independent judiciary and the law, properly enacted for a proper constitutional purpose.  Pakistan lawyers, Pakistan citizens and lawyers around the world have protested against the March 2007 suspension and house arrest of the Chief Justice of the Pakistan Supreme Court, the arrest and maltreatment of thousands protesting the chief justice's removal, the Emergency Measures Declaration of November 3, 2007 and suspension of the Constitution, the sacking and detention of judges who refused to conform to the Oath of Offices (Judges) Order 2007 and the arrests of thousands of lawyers and activists, including Pakistan's most senior lawyers. 

The emergency measures imposed on November 3, 2007 by Musharraf were unlawful under the Constitution, failed to meet United Nations standards for states of emergency and violate international standards for non-derogable rights. On November 5, 2007 the High Commissioner of Human Rights Louise Arbour characterized the state of emergency as illegitimate and called on Musharraf to restore the independent judiciary before the election. Instead thousands of lawyers, judges and activists were arrested for peacefully advocating adherence to customary international law and the Constitution and for peacefully protesting the military regime's suspension of the Constitution, sacking of judges, arrest of thousands of human rights defenders and violations of fundamental human rights and freedoms. 

LRWC, ALRC, LWB/C and 16 other NGOs representing thousands of lawyers around the world concluded, in the statement 4 submitted to the UNHRC, that the November 3, 2007 emergency measures were illegal and that all laws created and state actions taken into reliance on the Proclamation of Emergency of November 3, 2007 were enacted and done without legal authority and therefore are null and void, ab initio and must be reversed. 

On March 10, 2008 the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League (N) agreed, inter alia, " that the deposed judges would be restored, on the position as they were on November 2, 2007, within 30 days of the formation of the federal government through a parliamentary resolution." 5   Parliament was recalled on March 17, 2008.  Prime Minister Gilani unambiguously confirmed this commitment (the Murree Declaration) when he was sworn in on March 24/08.  However, it appears that the Parliament of Pakistan is unable to restore the judiciary or the Constitution while Musharraf is President without risking dissolution. Pressure from certain foreign governments seeking a military presence in Pakistan may also be a factor.

Required Action

LRWC, ALRC and LWB/C call on the government of Pakistan to:

  • denounce attacks on lawyers and others advocating the restoration of the judiciary and the Constitution; and,
  • denounce the attacks that resulted in the deaths of lawyers and other people in Karachi, April 9, 2008; and,
  • negotiate with all political parties and with representatives of the Lawyers Movement to reach an agreement on how best to honour the Murree Declaration and to restore and  protect an independent judiciary; and,
  • prevent further attacks and punish past attacks on lawyers, other rights-defenders and other people in Karachi by:

a) immediately providing effective protection; and,
b) conducting prompt and effective investigations into the deaths of all the people killed in Karachi on April 9, 2008; and,
c) ensuring the accountability of perpetrators including state agents, through proper prosecutions and fair trials and in accordance with the requirements of the UN Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions.

Lawyers Rights Watch Canada (LRWC) is a committee of Canadian lawyers who promote human rights and the rule of law internationally by providing support to lawyers and other human rights defenders in danger because of their advocacy. LRWC is an NGO in Special Consultative Status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations (ECOSOC/UN).   Other statements on Pakistan: www.lrwc.org/pub1.php    

Asian Legal Resource Centre (ALRC) is a Hong Kong-based NGO with General Consultative status with ECOSOC/UN. Founded in 1986 by a prominent group of jurists and human rights activists in Asia, ALRC promotes respect for human rights in the region through the strengthening of institutions of the rule of law, notably the police, prosecution and judiciary. It also seeks to strengthen and encourage positive action on legal and human rights issues by the bar and other legal bodies and personnel, at the local and national levels and to promote rights in the region through advocacy, research and publications, such as Article 2.

CONTACTS:
Lawyers Rights Watch Canada
www.lrwc.org; lrwc@portal.ca; +1 604 738 0338
Asian Legal Resource Centre Basil Fernando, Executive Director, Tel: +(852) - 2698-6339,  alrc@alrc.net; www.alrc.net
 

-------------

Footnotes:

1  This statement is also endorsed by Elise Groulx in her capacity as President of the International Criminal Defence Attorneys Association (ICDAA).
2 Adopted by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, 27 August to 7 September 1990. www.lrwc.org/documents/Pakistan.LRWC.Statement.to.UNHRC.Mar.08.doc
3  Adopted by the Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders held at Milan from 26 August to 6 September 1985 and endorsed by General Assembly resolutions 40/32 of 29 November 1985 and 40/146 of 13 December 1985.
4  Supra,note 1.
5  Murree Declaration, para. 2, http://www.hindu.com/nic/pakistan-murree.htm


# # #

About ALRC: The Asian Legal Resource Centre is an independent regional non-governmental organisation holding general consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. It is the sister organisation of the Asian Human Rights Commission. The Hong Kong-based group seeks to strengthen and encourage positive action on legal and human rights issues at local and national levels throughout Asia.

 

Wednesday, April 02, 2008

PAKISTAN: Legal implications of Gilani's moves

Legal implications of Gilani's moves
BASEER NAVEED
Guest Commentary, UPI Asia Online [
http://www.upiasiaonline.com ]
HONG KONG, China, April 2, 2008

The election of Yousaf Raza Gillani, who took office last week as prime minister of Pakistan, is a threat to the regime of President Pervez Musharraf, and even to his very existence. Gillani was loyal to the late Benazir Bhutto, the lifetime chairperson of the Pakistan People's Party, and is also loyal to her husband Asif Zardari and son Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, current co-chairmen of the party.

The new prime minister is considered a hawk and opposes the Musharraf government. His election sends a clear signal to the president from the coalition partners of the newly elected parliament.

The prime minister's first order was to release the deposed judges who were arrested after the imposition of a State of Emergency on Nov. 3 last year. The prime minister also requested the speaker and members of the National Assembly to issue two resolutions -- one calling for a probe into the Dec. 27 murder of Benazir Bhutto, and the second apologizing for the "judicial" murder of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, former prime minister and Bhutto's father, who was hanged on April 5, 1979 on the orders of the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

The first order to release the deposed judges was a clear denunciation of the actions of Musharraf against the superior judiciary. The issue of reinstating the chief justice and the other judges is a thorny one for Musharraf, as he had announced that the deposed judges would never be reinstated at any cost. He also claimed that deposed Chief Justice Iftikhar Choudhry is the most corrupt man in the country and a curse on the earth.

The National Assembly resolution requires that the deposed judges be reinstated within 30 days. After that, all the cases that have been decided or are still pending before the courts -- which were formed illegally and unconstitutionally by Musharraf through the State of Emergency and Provisional Constitution Order -- will have to be reconsidered, as the deposed judges had already declared the State of Emergency illegal and unconstitutional. Therefore the cases which were decided by the PCO judges have no legal basis.

When the judges are back in their seats, the first thing they will follow up on will be their own previous ruling against the emergency -- and by virtue of their decision the country will go back to the position of Nov. 2, 2007, in the political sense. Musharraf will be declared a "usurper" who abrogated the Constitution and will be liable to a challenge by any citizen under Article 6 of the Constitution of Pakistan -- possibly resulting in a death penalty.

The deposed judges of the Sindh High Court will restart proceedings against the perpetrators of the carnage of Karachi on May 12 last year, in which 140 persons were killed, when deposed Chief Justice Iftikhar Choudhry arrived in the city. It was while the High Court was dealing with this case that its judges were detained for almost 18 hours in their chambers and were beaten by members of the Mutehda Qaumi Movement, the coalition partner in Musharraf's government. During proceedings at the Sindh High Court, members of the MQM stormed the court building and again detained and beat the judges for several hours.

One good outcome of the prime minister's order will be the close contact between the judiciary and the lawmakers to ensure the rule of law and the supremacy of the judiciary, which will serve as a sharp sword over future governments and politicians as well. A strong civil society will emerge.

The two resolutions, regarding an enquiry into the murder of Benazir Bhutto through the United Nations and an apology from the parliament on the judicial murder of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, will have a far-reaching effect on the judiciary and army officers. The old judiciary, prior to March 9, 2007, was a poodle in the hands of military dictators and usurpers. If the resolution is passed in favor of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, it would result in something like the Nuremberg Tribunal and the army of Pakistan will have to face the consequences.

A U.N. probe into the murder of Benazir Bhutto will lead to an investigation of the role played by state intelligence agencies. A whole new chapter will be opened in the political history of Pakistan concerning the criminal role of intelligence agencies that had a hand in killing so many political leaders of the country, and even in the training of terrorists. This includes international terrorists -- Arabs, Afghans, Asians and Africans.

Such a probe could yield dangerous results, as it will expose how the military governments and rulers were involved in international terrorism, including the affairs of al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden.

--

(Baseer Naveed is a senior researcher for South Asia at the Asian Human Rights Commission in Hong Kong, China.)

http://www.upiasiaonline.com/Politics/2008/04/02/legal_implications_of_gilanis_moves/8981/

 

Ground is shifting beneath diplomacy with Pakistan

 Ground is shifting beneath diplomacy with Pakistan

In Islamabad

EPA

IN ISLAMABAD: Makhdoom Amin Fahim, a leader of the Pakistan People's Party, left, and new Prime Minister Yusaf Raza Gillani attend a session of the National Assembly.


By Laura King, Los Angeles Times Staff Writer

March 31, 2008
ISLAMABAD, PAKISTAN -- Not so long ago, the Bush administration could take a one-stop approach to its dealings with Pakistan. Whether Washington wanted to carry out airstrikes against Al Qaeda, trade sensitive intelligence or orchestrate the arrest of a terrorism suspect, it essentially came down to dialing the number of one man: President Pervez Musharraf.

Now all that has changed. Newly inaugurated Prime Minister Yusaf Raza Gillani has pledged to take a hard new look at counter-terrorism, the centerpiece of Musharraf's nearly nine-year rule. He will be backed by a Cabinet made up of former opposition figures who probably will be sworn in this week.

 An assertive new parliament is vowing to wield authority that lawmakers here lacked for years, demanding oversight on matters that were previously the president's sole purview. And the general who succeeded Musharraf as army chief four months ago has methodically removed the powerful military from politics and promised accountability to elected officials.

When it comes to relations with the United States, the public mood is angry. It is highly likely that some U.S. military actions routinely allowed under the old government will be subject to greater scrutiny.

But some analysts and officials said that despite a universal desire to put the United States on notice that the center of gravity has shifted away from Musharraf, many basic elements of the American-Pakistani relationship will remain in place, even in all-important security matters.

The new government has pledged to restore Pakistan's status as a parliamentary democracy in which the president has mainly ceremonial powers.

That seems in line with Musharraf's role of late. In the last week, he has occupied himself with duties such as watching a military parade from the reviewing stand and presiding over ceremonies like the somewhat awkward swearing-in of Gillani, whom Musharraf had once jailed for nearly five years.

"It's a sea change," said Talat Hussain, a senior journalist and analyst. "The whole idea of serious undertakings occurring on only one person's authority, without review or scrutiny by any institution -- that is the problem that everyone wanted addressed, and now it is being addressed."

The widespread perception of Musharraf as a puppet of the United States has been a driving force in events of recent months, including the devastating defeat of the president's party in February elections.

Many Pakistanis believe their army has been fighting what amounts to a proxy war for Americans against Islamic militants in the tribal belt bordering Afghanistan, and at the same time experiencing horrendous "blow back" in the form of dozens of suicide bombings that have ravaged Pakistani cities and towns.

"All these years, Musharraf did America's bidding," said flower vendor Abdul Rashid, whose soldier son died fighting insurgents in Pakistan's restive northwest. "And we are the ones who have suffered for it."

That chill was much in evidence during a visit last week by two senior American diplomats.

"Hands off, please, Uncle Sam!" a headline in the News, a nationally circulated daily, admonished arriving Deputy Secretary of State John D. Negroponte and Richard Boucher, the assistant secretary of State for South and Central Asian affairs.

Nawaz Sharif, the outspoken leader of the junior party in the new ruling coalition that trounced Musharraf's party in elections last month, held a get-acquainted session with the American envoys. Immediately after, he blamed cooperation with the United States against Islamic militants for causing Pakistani deaths.

"It is unacceptable that . . . we make our own country a killing field," he said at a news conference.

Even grizzled tribal elders jumped in to give the visiting Americans a piece of their mind, reminding them during a visit to the rugged frontier zone that the jirga, or traditional tribal council, has for centuries been the preferred method of problem-solving.

Despite the anger directed at Washington, there still are many areas in which the new government is likely to work with the United States, including counter-terrorism.

"It wouldn't be fair to characterize it as a change in fundamental goals," said Husain Haqqani, a Boston University professor who is expected to play a senior foreign policy role in the new government.

"In fact, in my opinion, the elected government will be far more effective because it will have popular legitimacy, and whatever commitments are made to the Americans will not be undone on legal or other grounds," Haqqani said.

Musharraf was thought to have given tacit approval for U.S. airstrikes in the tribal areas, including a missile attack that killed a senior Al Qaeda figure in January.U.S. intelligence has warned for more than a year that elements of the Taliban and Al Qaeda have regrouped and strengthened in the tribal areas, where the Pakistani government has almost no authority. Pakistani military efforts in the borderlands have had little effect.

"There may be some new parameters set on outside types of intervention," said a Western official in Pakistan, speaking on condition of anonymity. "But I think we will still be able to achieve certain objectives that would be in everyone's interests."

 Closer civilian oversight of Pakistan's shadowy intelligence services is one expected change under the new administration, said a senior figure in the ruling coalition, speaking on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak publicly on the matter.

In the past, the Pakistani intelligence services helped nurture the Taliban and other militant groups, seeing them as a means of challenging India over Kashmir and keeping neighboring Afghanistan quiescent.

Even while promising changes in government strategy for dealing with the militants, Gillani, the prime minister, stressed in his policy address that Pakistan and the Americans wanted many of the same things.

"It is our fight too," he said.

But Gillani and other senior coalition figures have suggested that they want to see far greater emphasis on education and economic aid in the impoverished tribal areas.

Officials in the new government, including Gillani, have raised the idea of talks with the militants -- but not without conditions. The new prime minister said the government would be willing to negotiate with insurgents who laid down their arms.

Other leaders, though, say many of the insurgents fall into a gray area. Maulana Fazlur Rehman, whose religious party has allied itself with the ruling coalition, said someone should not be branded a terrorist just for having devout religious beliefs.

"It is difficult to divide humanity on the basis of who is an extremist and should be eliminated, and who is a moderate and can be lived with," he told lawmakers.

Negroponte, at the end of his visit, told reporters in the port city of Karachi that some extremists were "irreconcilable" and negotiations with them would be impossible.

"I don't see how you can talk to these kinds of people," he said.

Militants clearly hope to drive a wedge between the new government and the U.S. over the issue. A leader of Pakistan's Taliban, Maulana Faqir Mohammed, said he would welcome talks with Pakistani leaders.

"Our war is with America," Mohammed said.

Many Pakistanis have bitter memories of undiminished American support for Musharraf during a period of de facto martial law last year, during which thousands of political opponents were thrown in jail. Days after the start of that crackdown, Negroponte, testifying before Congress, described Musharraf as an "indispensable" ally.

In Karachi, asked for his current assessment of a leader now vulnerable to impeachment by a hostile parliament, the envoy paused.

"He is of course president of the country," he said of Musharraf. Whatever the Pakistani people decide about his ultimate political fate, Negroponte said, "we will certainly respect."

laura.king@latimes.com

http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/front/la-fg-uspakistan31mar31,1,5876773.story

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