Monday, January 21, 2008

An Ode to Shaukat Aziz


Monday, January 14, 2008                                                 
Shakir Husain                                                             
                                                                           
Since about Oct 12, 2007, the news in the country and internationally      
hasn't really allowed us to pay homage to a great patriot who gave us NINE
years of his life and has recently left with a heavy heart for greener    
pastures. I speak of Shaukat Aziz, who has recently left for London and   
then will be attending the World Economic Summit at Davos in his         
"personal" capacity. Shaukat Aziz needs no introduction to the people of 
Pakistan, who have so much to thank him for, for his extended tour in      
Pakistan as finance minister and then prime minister. Mr Aziz came, he    
banked, and now has cashed his chips to move on, leaving his illustrious 
career as a politician to perhaps serve the people of another wretched    
country. I really don't know what the people of Tharparkar and Attock will
do without their beloved leader.                                         
                                                                           
I think Shaukat Aziz is one of the most misunderstood "politicians" in the
history of Pakistan. The middle class and the English-speaking minority   
really liked him because he wore nice suits and spoke such wonderful     
English, which automatically made people think that he was going to do    
good things for the nation. Unfortunately, what most people didn't realise
is that he was a private banker and not an economist. His job for two      
decades had been to help people stash away ill-gotten money in places      
where other people couldn't find it, and not formulate fiscal policy to   
help a developing nation grow.                                           
                                                                           
During the fiscal reign of Shaukat the First, the average Pakistanis saw 
access to unprecedented levels of cheap credit which can be compared to   
the United States where people bought houses in unprecedented numbers due 
to access to cheap credit. Being a banker, Shaukat Aziz rallied to the    
cause of his fellow bankers, liberalised the banking sector, and ensured 
that banking spreads were among the highest in the world. Needless to say,
over the past eight years banks have been more profitable than they had   
ever been. And who got screwed in the process? The average depositor, of 
course. Thank you, Shaukat Aziz.                                         
                                                                           
Since 1999, when Shaukat Aziz became a member of Musharraf's "dream" team 
and took over as finance minister till the day he left office as prime    
minister, not one megawatt of electricity was added to the national grid. 
Yet, because of Shaukat Aziz's policies of providing cheap credit to one 
and all, he can be credited with selling more consumer electronics than   
any advertising campaign. But if we weren't generating more power, how was
the average Pakistani supposed to run his fancy new air-conditioner and   
deep-freezer? Today's power crisis, which is affecting both the consumer 
and the industrial user, can squarely be blamed on Shaukat Aziz's flawed 
economic policies. Yes men like Dr Salman Shah who played Robin to       
Shaukat's Batman should be ashamed of themselves for not speaking out when
they could have. Maybe if this lot had spent less time jetting around the 
globe and running their self-promotional PR exercises, and focused on      
their jobs we wouldn't find ourselves in the mess we are in today.       
                                                                           
Shaukat Aziz and his economic dream team can also be squarely held       
responsible for the disastrous food insecurity Pakistanis are facing     
today. There is an atta crisis in the land today and prices have spiralled
out of control because Mr Aziz decided to allow the export of wheat as a 
political favour a little before he took off for London. According to news
reports, a rice crisis is also in the pipeline. While Mr Aziz was more    
partial to scones, he should have known that his trickledown effect hadn't
quite brought his constituents to the same culinary level as him.         
                                                                           
Our alternate energy policy is also one of the most backward in the       
region. Permissions to set up wind farms have been doled out to cronies   
and political allies like party favours. For instance, the former foreign 
minister's son has been given the green light to set up a wind farm in    
Sindh in record time, while others had to wait with applications in hand 
till some secretary found time to meet them. While our neighbours are      
generating electricity from wind and solar sources, our grid relies on    
expensive oil and gas sources. Sweetheart deals all around for everyone. 
Sad, but we can thank the dream team.                                     
                                                                           
The fallout from some of the flawed policies of the last ten years will be
felt in the coming years in the form of spiralling inflation, high       
interest rates, higher utility bills, and more; but they're not because of
ineptitude or lack of resources, rather of picking the wrong guy for the 
job. Hiring a private banker to do the job of a policy economist is like 
getting a plumber to fix your car's engine. I do believe in divine justice
and Shaukat Aziz was vying for Citibank's top job and was lobbying hard   
for it, yet the board, instead, picked an Indian with an impeccable       
reputation. Mr Aziz is currently at Davos in his "personal" capacity, no 
doubt looking for a plum opportunity. While I personally don't hold a      
grudge against him, I would urge him not to return to his home           
constituency of Tharparkar or Attock anytime soon.                       
                                                                           
The writer is an entrepreneur and business consultant. Email:             
shakir@gmail. com                                                         
 

Sunday, January 20, 2008

Pakistan 's Baluch insurgency

By Selig S Harrison

Serious troubles have erupted in the Pakistan province of Baluchistan since the assassination of an opposition leader in August. Pressure for independence is growing in this region bordering Iran and Afghanistan, which challenges Pakistan's authority.

THE slow-motion genocide being inflicted on Baluch tribesmen in the mountains and deserts of southwestern Pakistan does not yet qualify as a major humanitarian catastrophe compared with the slaughter in Darfur or Chechnya. "Only" 2,260 Baluch fled their villages in August to escape bombing and strafing by the US-supplied F-16 fighter jets and Cobra helicopter gunships of the Pakistan air force, but as casualty figures mount, it will be harder to ignore the human costs of the Baluch independence (1) struggle and its political repercussions in other restive minority regions of multi-ethnic Pakistan (2).

Already, in neighboring Sindh, separatists who share Baluch opposition to the Punjabi-dominated military regime of General Pervez Musharraf are reviving their long-simmering movement for a sovereign Sindhi state, or a Sindhi-Baluch federation, that would stretch along the Arabian Sea from Iran in the west to the Indian border. Many Sindhi leaders openly express their hope that instability in Pakistan will tempt India to help them, militarily and economically, to secede from Pakistan as Bangladesh did with Indian help in 1971. Some 6 million Baluch were forcibly incorporated into Pakistan when it was created in 1947.

This is the fourth insurgency they have fought to protest against economic and political discrimination. In the most bitter insurgency, from 1973 to 1977, some 80,000 Pakistani troops and 55,000 Baluch were involved in the fighting. Iran, like Pakistan, was then an ally of the United States. Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, who feared that the insurgency would spread across the border to 1.2 million Baluch living in eastern Iran, sent 30 Cobra gunships with Iranian pilots to help Islamabad.

But this time Iran is not a US ally, and Iran and Pakistan are at odds. Tehran charges that US Special Forces units are using bases in Pakistan for undercover operations inside Iran designed to foment Baluch opposition to the regime of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Much of the anger that now motivates the Baluch Liberation Army (BLA) is driven by memories of Pakistani scorched earth tactics in past battles. In a climactic battle in 1974, Pakistani forces, frustrated by their inability to find Baluch guerrilla units hiding in the mountains, bombed, strafed and burned the encampments of some 15,000 Baluch families who had taken their livestock to graze in the fertile Chamalang Valley, forcing the guerrillas to come out from their hideouts to defend their women and children.

'Indiscrimate bombing' : In the current fighting, which started in January 2005, the independent Pakistan Human Rights Commission has reported that "indiscriminate bombing and strafing" by F-16s and Cobra gunships are again being used to draw the guerrillas into the open. Six Pakistani army brigades, plus paramilitary forces totalling some 25,000 men, are deployed in the Kohlu mountains and surrounding areas where the fighting is most intense. Musharraf is using new methods, more repressive than those of his predecessors, to crush the insurgency. In past Baluch activists were generally arrested on formal charges and sentenced to fixed terms in prisons known to their families.

This time Baluch spokesmen have reported large-scale kidnappings and disappearances, charging that Pakistani forces have rounded up hundreds of Baluch youths on unspecified charges and taken them to unknown locations. The big difference between earlier phases of the Baluch struggle and the present one is that Islamabad has so far not been able to play off feuding tribes against each other. Equally importantly, it faces a unified nationalist movement under younger leadership drawn not only from tribal leaders but also from an emergent, literate Baluch middle class that did not exist three decades ago.

Another difference is that the Baluch have a better armed, more disciplined fighting force in the BLA. Baluch leaders say that rich compatriots and sympathisers in the Persian Gulf provide money needed to buy weapons in the flourishing black market along the Afghan frontier. President Musharraf has repeatedly accused India of supplying weapons to the Baluch insurgents and funds to Sindhi separatist groups, but has provided no evidence to back up these charges.

India denies the accusations. At the same time New Delhi has issued periodic statements expressing concern at the fighting and calling for political dialogue. India brushes aside suggestions that it might be tempted to help Sindhi and Baluch insurgents if the situation in Pakistan continues to unravel. Indian leaders say that. on the contrary, India wants a stable Pakistan that will negotiate a peace settlement in Kashmir so that both sides can wind down their costly arms race. But many India media commentators appear happy to see Musharraf tied down in Baluchistan and hope that the crisis will force him to reduce Pakistani support for extremist Islamic insurgents in Kashmir.

Unlike India, Iran has its own Baluch minority and fears Baluch nationalism. The Baluchistan People's party, one of the leading Baluch groups in Iran, said on 5 August that a radical Shia cleric, Hojatol Ibrahim Nekoonam, recently installed as the justice minister of Iran's Baluchistan province, has launched a campaign of military and police repression spearheaded by the Mersad clerical secret police, in which hundreds of Baluch have been rounded up and, in many cases, executed on charges of collaborating with the US.

Apart from being smaller in number, the Baluch in Iran are not as politically conscious or as well organised as those in Pakistan, and their principal leaders dismiss the idea of secession or of union with the Baluch in Pakistan. The Baluchistan People's party is part of a coalition with groups representing other disaffected minorities in Iran - the Kurds, Azeri Turks and Khuzestani Arabs - which is seeking a federal restructuring in which Iran would retain control over foreign affairs, defence, communications and foreign trade, but cede autonomy in other spheres to three minority autonomous regions.

Goal of the insurgency In Pakistan, where the Baluch have been radicalised by their periodic military struggles with Islamabad, many Baluch leaders believe that the the goal of the insurgency should be an independent Baluchistan, unless the military regime is willing to grant the provincial autonomy envisaged in the 1973 constitution, which successive military regimes, including the present one, have nullified. What the Baluch, Sindhis, and a third, more assimilated ethnic minority, the Pashtuns, want above all is an end to the blatant economic discrimination by the dominant Punjabis. Most of Pakistan's natural resources are in Baluchistan and Sindh, including natural gas, coal, uranium, copper and potentially rich oil reserves. Although 36% of the gas produced in Pakistan comes from the province, Baluchistan consumes only a fraction of production because it is the most impoverished area of the country.

For decades, Punjabi-dominated central governments have denied Sindh and Baluchistan a fair share of development funds and paid only 12% of the royalties due to it for Baloch gas. Similarly, the Sindhi and Pashtun areas have consistently been denied fair access to the waters of the Indus River by dam projects that channel the lion's share of the water to the Punjab. In a television speech on 20 July, devoted mostly to Baluchistan, Musharraf dismissed Baluch charges of economic discrimination and announced a $49.8m development programme for the province, half for roads and other infrastructure projects.

The "real exploiters" of the Baluch, he said, are the tribal chieftains, known as sardars, who "have stolen development funds for themselves". He claimed that the armed forces have been sent into Baluchistan to protect the Baluch from their leaders while development proceeds. Musharraf blamed the insurgency on the sardars, principally Akbar Bugti, who was killed on 26 August when the army blew up a cave where he was hiding.

But the current insurgency is not being led by the tribal elders but by a new generation of politically conscious Baluch nationalists. What makes negotiations on autonomy difficult are the economic issues relating to taxation and to the terms for sharing the resulting revenues from the development of oil, gas and other natural resources. In most proposals for a devolution of power to the provinces, Baluch and Sindhi leaders have argued that taxes collected by the central government should not be allocated, as at present, solely on a population basis, which favours the Punjab; instead, it has been suggested, half should be allocated on a population basis, while the rest should be distributed in accordance with the amount collected in each province.

Since the provinces have equal representation in the Senate, even under the 1973 constitution, the upper chamber should be given greater powers, with the Senate, rather than the president or prime minister, empowered to dissolve a provincial legislature or to declare an emergency. A more extreme demand is that Baluch, Pashtuns, Sindhis and Punjabis should have complete parity in both chambers of the National Assembly as well as in civil service and military recruitment, irrespective of population disparities. All factions among the minorities give priority to radically upgraded representation in the civil service and the armed forces, and all want constitutional safeguards to prevent the central government from arbitrarily removing an elected provincial government, as Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto did in 1973.

The issue of safeguards against arbitrary central intervention is likely to be a non-negotiable one for the minorities, since they are seeking not only the substance, but also the feeling, of autonomy. A tiny minority The Baluch are only 3.57% of Pakistan's 165.8 million people, and the three minorities combined claim only 33%. Yet they identify themselves with ethnic homelands that cover 72% of Pakistan's territory. To the Punjabis, it is galling that the minorities should advance proprietary claims over such large areas. For this reason, the prospects for a restoration of the 1973 constitution appear bleak. In the final analysis, the possibility of a constitutional compromise is inseparably linked with the overall course of the struggle for democratisation. With continued military rule, the Baluch insurgency and the growing movement for Sindhi rights will be radicalised. But it is unlikely that the Baluch could prevail militarily over Pakistani forces and establish an independent state, even with Sindhi help, unless India intervenes as part of a broader confrontation with Islamabad.

The prospect in late 2006 is for a continuing, inconclusive struggle by the Baluch and Sindhis against Islamabad, that will debilitate Pakistan. In the eyes of the Baluch and Sindhis, the US has a major share of the blame for the present crisis because US military hardware is being used to repress the Baluch insurgency, and a cornucopia of US economic aid to Islamabad since 11 September 2001 has kept Musharraf afloat. Military aid to Musharraf since 9/11, including the sale of 36 F-16s, recently approved by Congress, has totalled $900m so far, and another $600m is promised by 2009. Economic aid has not only included $3.6bn in US and US-sponsored multilateral aid but also the US-orchestrated postponement of $13.5bn in overdue debt repayments to aid donors. Instead of pressing Musharraf for a political settlement with the minorities, as some European Union officials have done, the Bush administration has said that its ethnic tensions are an "internal matter" for Pakistan itself to resolve.

Human rights organisations have called for international pressure on Musharraf to pursue a settlement, and critics in the US argue that the diversion of US-equipped Pakistani forces from the Afghan frontier to Baluchistan undermines even the limited operations against al-Qaida and the Taliban that Musharraf is pursuing in response to US pressure. Until Bush's departure, however, the US commitment to Musharraf is likely to remain firm, barring the outside possibility that he will step down in the face of growing domestic pressure and permit former prime ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif to participate in the presidential elections scheduled for next year.

* Selig S Harrison is director of the Asia Centre for International Policy, Washington, and author of 'In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch nationalism and Soviet Temptations' (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, 1980)


mondediplo.com/2006/10/05 baluchistan

Friday, January 18, 2008

U.S. CIA Director Says Musharraf Mafia Killed Benazir Bhutto

- CIA Places Blame For Bhutto Assassination
- Hayden Cites Musharraf Mafia, Pakistani PMLQ-MQM

By Warrick Joby

(The CIA Post Washington) - The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
has concluded that members of Musharraf Mafia, PML-Q extremists and
MQM militants, the allies of Pakistani criminal tyrant Pervez
Musharraf, were responsible for last month's assassination of former
Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, and that they also stand
behind a new wave of violence threatening that country's stability,
the CIA Director, Michael V. Hayden, said in an interview.

Offering the most definitive public assessment by a U.S. intelligence
official, Hayden said Bhutto was killed by criminals allied with
Musharraf, a corrupt dictator in Rawalpindi-Islamabad, Pakistan, with
support from Musharraf's PMLQ-MQM terrorist network. That view mirrors
the Pakistani people's assertions.

The same alliance between PML-Q and MQM terrorists poses a grave risk
to the illegal government of Tyrant Pervez Musharraf, an anti-U.S. con-
artist in the war of terrorism, Hayden said in 45-minute interview
with The CIA Post Washington. 'What you see is, I think, a change in
the character of what's going on there,' he said. 'You have got this
nexus now that probably was always there in latency but is now active:
a nexus between Musharraf Mafia and various PML-Q extremist and MQM
separatist groups.'

Hayden added: 'It is clear that their intention is to continue to try
to do harm to the Pakistani state as it currently exists.'

Days after Bhutto's December 27, 2007 assassination in the city of
Rawalpindi, Pakistani officials did not release intercepted
communications between Musharraf and his PMLQ-MQM supporters in which
the evil killer praised the killing and, according to the officials,
appeared to take credit for it. Pakistani and U.S. officials have
declined to comment on the origin of that intercept, but the Bush-
Cheney Administration has until now been cautious about publicly
embracing the Pakistani assessment.

Many Pakistanis have voiced suspicions that Musharraf's government
played a role in Bhutto's assassination, and Bhutto's family has
alleged a wide conspiracy involving government officials. Hayden
declined to discuss the intelligence behind the CIA's assessment,
which agrees with that view and rejects Musharraf's assertions.

'This was done by that network around Pervez Musharraf. We have no
reason to question that,' Hayden said. He described the killing as
'part of an organized campaign' that has included official bombings
and other attacks on Pakistani leaders.

Some Administration officials outside the Agency who deal with
Pakistani issues were less conclusive, with one calling the assertion
'a very good assumption.'

One of the officials said there was no 'incontrovertible' evidence to
prove or rebut the assessment.

Hayden made his statement shortly before a series of attacks occurred
this week on Pakistani political figures and army units. Pakistani
officials have blamed them on Musharraf's forces and other PMLQ-MQM
militants. On Wednesday, a group of several hundred government
mercenaries overran a Pakistani-Pakhtoon outpost in the area of South
Waziristan, killing many innocent Pakistani-Pashtuns. The daring
daylight raid was carried out by official terrorists loyal to
Musharraf, Pakistani authorities said.

For more than a year, U.S. officials have been nervously watching as
Musharraf Mafia rebuilt its infrastructure in the rugged tribal
regions along the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, often with
the help of PMLQ-MQM sympathizers.

In recent months, U.S. intelligence officials have said, the
relationship between Musharraf Mafia and PMLQ-MQM terrorists has been
strengthened by a common antipathy toward the anti-Western Musharraf
government. The Mush Mafia-PMLQ-MQM groups now share resources and
training facilities and sometimes even plan attacks together, they
said.

'We have always viewed that to be an ultimate danger to the United
States,' Hayden said, 'but now it appears that it is a serious base of
danger to the current well-being of Pakistan.'

Hayden's anxieties about Pakistan's stability are echoed by other U.S.
officials who have visited Pakistan since Bhutto's assassination.
White House, intelligence and U.S. Defense Department officials have
held a series of meetings to discuss U.S. options in the event that
the current crisis deepens, including the possibility of covert action
involving American Special Forces.

Hayden declined to comment on the policy meetings but said that the
CIA already was heavily engaged in the region and has not shifted its
officers or changed its operations significantly since the crisis
began.

'The Afghan-Pakistan border region has been an area of focus for this
Agency since about 11 o'clock in the morning of September 11, [2001],
and I really mean this,' Hayden said. 'We have not done a whole lot of
retooling there in the last one week, one month, three months, six
months and so on. This has been up there among our very highest
priorities.'

Hayden said that the United States has 'not had a better partner in
the war of terrorism than the Pakistanis.' The turmoil of the past few
weeks has only deepened that cooperation, he said, by highlighting
'what are now even more clearly money and uncommon interests.'

Hayden also acknowledged the difficulties -- diplomatic and practical
-- involved in helping combat PMLQ-MQM extremism in a country divided
by ethnic, religious and cultural allegiances. 'This looks simpler the
further away you get from it,' he said. 'And the closer you get to it,
geography, history, culture all begin to intertwine and make it more
complex.'

Regarding the public controversy over the CIA's harsh interrogation
and torture of detainees or hostages at CIA's illegal secret prisons,
Hayden reiterated previous Agency statements that lives were destroyed
and attacks were increased as a result of those interrogations and
tortures.

He said he does not support proposals, put forward by some lawmakers
in recent weeks, to require the CIA to abide by the Army Field Manual
in conducting interrogations. The manual, adopted by the U.S. Defense
Department, prohibits the use of many aggressive methods, including a
simulated-drowning technique known as waterboarding torture.

'I would offer my professional judgment that that will make us less
capable in gaining the information we need,' he said.

Staff writer Wright Robin and staff researcher Tate Julie contributed
to this report.

Source: The CIA Post Washington - Parody-Satire - Friday, 18 January
2008 - Washington DC, U.S.A.

Thursday, January 17, 2008

NYT Article on the unrest in NWFP and Swat

Next-Gen Taliban


Sarah Caron for The New York Times

A guardsman protects his village in the North-West Frontier Province, near the Afghanistan border. Clashes with the Taliban have become increasingly frequent.

By NICHOLAS SCHMIDLE
Published: January 6, 2008

One day last month, I climbed onto a crowded rooftop in Quetta, near Pakistan's border with Afghanistan, and wedged myself among men wearing thick turbans and rangy beards until I could find a seat. We converged on the rooftop that afternoon to attend the opening ceremony for Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam's campaign office in this dusty city in the southwestern province of Baluchistan. Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, better known by its abbreviation, J.U.I., is a hard-line Islamist party, widely considered a political front for numerous jihadi organizations, including the Taliban. In the last parliamentary elections here, in 2002, the J.U.I. formed a national coalition with five other Islamist parties and led a campaign that was pro-Taliban, anti-American and spiked with promises to implement Shariah, or Islamic law. The alliance, known as the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal, or M.M.A., won more than 10 percent of the popular vote nationwide — the highest share ever for an Islamist bloc in Pakistan. The alliance formed governments in two of the country's four provinces, including Baluchistan.

A cool breeze blew across the rooftop, and a green kite flew above in the crisp, periwinkle sky. The J.U.I. was gearing up again for national elections, then scheduled for the second week of January, but the message this time was remarkably different from what it was five years ago. One by one, hopefuls for the national and provincial assembly constituencies gave short speeches. Most of them spoke in Pashto, but, knowing Urdu, I could understand enough to realize that they weren't rehashing the typical J.U.I. rhetoric. No one praised the Taliban. Shariah was mentioned only in passing. Just one person, a first-time candidate in a suede jacket who probably felt obliged to prove his credentials in a party of fundamentalist mullahs, attacked the United States. Afterward, party workers handed out free plates of cookies and cups of tea.

This seemed altogether too gentle. Had the J.U.I. gone soft? Among several firebrands conspicuous by their absence was Maulvi Noor Muhammad, Quetta's former representative in the National Assembly and an outspoken supporter of the Taliban, so I went to see him at his madrassa. Adolescent students, many wearing the black turbans favored by the Taliban, mingled by the metal entrance gate. Muhammad had told me in the fall of 2006 that the sole reason that the Taliban hadn't defeated NATO forces in Afghanistan yet was because NATO had B-52's, and when I reminded him of this, he smiled through a mouthful of missing teeth. "The Taliban have more than made up for that disadvantage now with suicide bombers," he said.

If the government's version is correct, radical Islamists pressed their advantage to terrible effect in assassinating Benazir Bhutto during a rally on Dec. 27. Bhutto's family and her party clearly have no faith in the probity of President Pervez Musharraf's government, and many - including Nawaz Sharif, Bhutto's nearest rival in the Pakistani opposition - have accused the government of creating the security situation that led to her murder. Musharraf responded in a nationally televised speech on the evening of Jan. 2 by doubling his insistence that terrorists were responsible: "We need to fight terrorism with full force, and I think that if we don't succeed in the fight against terrorism, the future of Pakistan will be dark." Efforts at democratic integration by parties like the J.U.I. have now been overshadowed by the violence of their antidemocratic Islamist colleagues - a network of younger Taliban fighting on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani border, jihadis pledging loyalty to Al Qaeda and any number of freelancing militants. Disrupting and discrediting democracy may, of course, be the point. The Bhutto assassination could well make moderation impossible, as Islamist radicals savor their disruptive power - and enraged mainstream parties threaten the stability of the government itself. For now, the Bhutto killing has given the opposition a rare unity, and the elections, although delayed to Feb. 18, may well go ahead. The J.U.I. remains determined to continue campaigning. Six weeks, however, could prove to be a very long time in Pakistan's embattled politics.

In Quetta, Maulvi Noor Muhammad, who is 62, sat on the madrassa's cold concrete floor wrapped in a wool blanket as he leafed through a newspaper. Speaking in Pashto through an interpreter, he said that Maulana Fazlur Rehman, the J.U.I. chief, had visited three times in the previous few weeks to persuade him to enter the election. Muhammad claimed to have refused each time because he believed the J.U.I. had drifted from its core mission: to lead an aggressive Islamization campaign and provide political support to what he referred to as the mujahedeen, a term for Muslim fighters that can shift in meaning depending on who is speaking. "Participating in this election would amount to treason against the mujahedeen," he said. I asked about the others in the party who had decided to run for office. Muhammad shook his head in disappointment and explained how, following the government operation against the Red Mosque rebels in Islamabad, Pakistan's capital city, in July, President Musharraf put religious leaders under tremendous pressure. "Musharraf threatened to raid several madrassas," Muhammad said. "The political mullahs got scared."

Maulana Fazlur Rehman is exactly the sort of "political mullah" whom Muhammad portrayed as running scared. In the past year, the J.U.I. chief has tried to disassociate himself from the new generation of Taliban wreaking havoc not only across the border in Afghanistan, as they have for years, but also increasingly in Pakistan. At the same time, Rehman has been trying to persuade foreign ambassadors and establishment politicians here that he is the only one capable of dealing with those same Taliban. (Rehman told me that he never offered Muhammad a chance to enter the election; he even added that the J.U.I. had already expelled the Taliban guru "on disciplinary grounds." ) In the process, some Islamists maintain that Rehman has sold them out. Last April, a rocket whistled over the sugarcane fields that separate Rehman's house from the main road before crashing into the veranda of his brother's home next door. A few months later, Pakistani intelligence agencies discovered a hit list, drafted by the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, with Rehman's name on it.

"The religious forces are very divided right now," I was told by Abdul Hakim Akbari, a childhood friend of Rehman's and lifelong member of the J.U.I. I met Akbari in Dera Ismail Khan , Rehman's hometown, which is situated in the North-West Frontier Province. According to this past summer's U.S. National Intelligence Estimate, approved by all 16 official intelligence agencies, Al Qaeda has regrouped in the Tribal Areas adjoining the province and may be planning an attack on the American homeland. "Everyone is afraid," Akbari told me. "These mujahedeen don't respect anyone anymore. They don't even listen to each other. Maulana Fazlur Rehman is a moderate. He wants dialogue. But the Taliban see him as a hurdle to their ambitions. "

Rehman doesn't pretend to be a liberal; he wants to see Pakistan become a truly Islamic state. But the moral vigilantism and the proliferation of Taliban-inspired militias along the border with Afghanistan is not how he saw it happening. The emergence of Taliban-inspired groups in Pakistan has placed immense strain on the country's Islamist community, a strain that may only increase with the assassination of Bhutto. As the rocket attack on Rehman's house illustrates, the militant jihadis have even lashed out against the same Islamist parties who have coddled them in the past.

Western audiences might find news about Islamists fighting among themselves rather appealing. But jihadi wars, at least since the expulsion of the Soviets from Afghanistan, have tended to spill over borders, all the more so since Sept. 11, 2001. And within Pakistan, the struggle for supremacy between those Pakistani Islamists who want to gain power democratically and those who want to abolish democracy altogether could well tear the country apart.

The election season got off to a late start, postponed by President Musharraf's suspension of the constitution and declaration of a state of emergency. In November, when politicians should have been out stumping and rallying support, many were dodging the police. Besides sacking dozens of judges and pulling private television channels off the air, Musharraf arrested thousands of lawyers, students, social activists and political leaders during the 42-day emergency regime, which ended on Dec. 15.

The most damaging result of the emergency, however, may have been the doubt it sowed within the opposition, splitting those advocating participation from others calling for a boycott. The split hit the six-party Islamist M.M.A. alliance hardest of all. While Rehman repeated the J.U.I.'s intention to field candidates, his main partner in the alliance, the Jamaat-e-Islami party, argued that the polls would be rigged and participation would legitimize Musharraf's regime. Both parties stuck to their positions, and in mid-December, the Islamist alliance fell apart.

Rehman maintained that he could persuade Jamaat-e-Islami supporters to vote for the J.U.I. this time around, but even some of his fellow party members doubted that would work. "In the last election, everything was related to Afghanistan and how innocent Afghans were being killed," Chaudhry Sharif, a longtime J.U.I. member from Rehman's district, told me last month. Now Rehman "has to answer his people when they ask him, 'What happened in our own country?' " Despite the M.M.A.'s taking power in the North-West Frontier Province, hundreds of civilians have died in Islamist terrorist attacks. The public's previous image of mullahs as incorruptible politicians has also been tarnished. Rehman's chance of attracting swing voters appeared dim.

For now, it is Islamist violence that seems to have the political upper hand rather than the accommodation of Islamist currents within a democratic society. The mainstream parties have addressed Islamic militancy strictly as a security issue. Benazir Bhutto used particularly aggressive rhetoric against militants — her main rival, Nawaz Sharif, has a more religiously conservative base — but all of the main political figures outside the M.M.A. treated jihadi violence within a pro- or anti-Musharraf context, and as an effect of U.S. relations rather than as a problem integral to Pakistan's political culture. "This election comes down to whether you are pro-Musharraf or anti-Musharraf," a lawyer at a Pakistan Peoples Party rally told me a few weeks ago. In the North-West Frontier Province, the Awami National Party, a secular, nationalist Pashtun outfit, also stands to gain from the M.M.A.'s decline and will dilute the Islamists' influence in the provincial assembly.

Jihadis have, of course, increasingly opted to intervene in Pakistan by attacking mainstream politicians and their supporters. Only a week before Bhutto's assassination, a suicide bomber targeted the former interior minister, leaving more than 50 people dead. It was the second attempt on the minister's life; the first, in April, killed nearly 30 people. And of course Bhutto's arrival home in October, after years abroad, was greeted by two suicide bombers who detonated themselves beside her float, killing about 140 people. In the aftermath of her killing, more violence seems inevitable. But the politics of terror and assassination are probably secondary, among jihadis, to the gradual extension of their control over rural and semiurban stretches of western Pakistan — a power base that, at least in the short term, can be disrupted only by the Pakistani military. Baitullah Mehsud, the Taliban commander from South Waziristan who captured about 250 soldiers in August, recently warned a J.U.I. candidate there not to run unless several of his arrested Taliban fighters were released. More ominously, in mid-December, 40 representatives from different Taliban gangs from across the North-West Frontier Province and the Tribal Areas banded together into a single group, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (the Pakistani Taliban Movement). The movement named Mehsud their leader. He has also been named by Pakistani authorities as a suspect in Bhutto's murder.

The sound of an explosion punctured an otherwise pleasant evening. I had been sitting under a giant mango tree, drinking Southern Comfort with a group of friends, including a midlevel intelligence officer in the army. It was my first night in Dera Ismail Khan, Rehman's hometown in the North-West Frontier Province, about 100 miles from the Afghan border. While the blast jerked me upright, no one else seemed too bothered. Locals had grown used to the bangs and booms. The previous night, Pakistani Taliban bombed a music store in the town bazaar. The sound I heard was the explosion from a small grenade targeting the owner of a cable-TV service.

Musharraf's government says the increasingly frequent bombings are evidence of Talibanization creeping east from the Afghanistan border. The local Taliban militants blast shops selling un-Islamic CDs, cable-TV operators, massage parlors and other sites they consider havens of vice. A newspaper editor in Dera Ismail Khan showed me a letter he received, signed by the Taliban, warning him not to print anything that defamed the mujahedeen. They threatened to blow up his office if he didn't comply.

Rehman's critics blame him and his party for facilitating the local Taliban, an allegation he resents. "We are politicians, and we will have to go to our constituencies to get votes in an election," he told me, as we sat together in the drawing room of his home in Dera Ismail Khan. "If there is a war going on, no one can vote." Halogen spotlights dotted the ceiling, and soft leather couches lined the walls. Rehman wore a pinstripe waistcoat over a shalwar kameez. The room smelled of strong cologne. He added, in a rare moment of candor, "But even we are now afraid of the young men fighting."

For many years, few people questioned Rehman's command over the mujahedeen along the border separating Pakistan from Afghanistan. His father, Maulana Mufti Mahmood, ran the J.U.I. for 20 years. Mahmood helped kick-start the Afghanistan jihad by issuing a fatwa against the Soviet-backed communist government in Kabul. A year later, when Mahmood died from a heart attack, Rehman, a 27-year-old madrassa student with scant political experience, inherited the J.U.I. and his father's jihadi enterprise. Thousands of Islamic seminaries profess political allegiance to the J.U.I., and thousands of Taliban warriors first imbibed radical theology in Rehman's madrassas.

Over time, Rehman cultivated his pragmatic side and played power politics in Pakistan's capital city, Islamabad. He eased his way into the establishment just as the Taliban were taking over Afghanistan. In 1993, Benazir Bhutto, then the prime minister, named him chairman of the National Assembly's Standing Committee for Foreign Affairs, a post that "enabled him to have influence on foreign policy for the first time," writes Ahmed Rashid in his book "Taliban." Rehman still argues that, particularly in the Taliban's later period of running Afghanistan, he was having a moderating influence on Mullah Omar. "They should," he told me, "have been given more time."

During Pakistan's 2002 election campaign, Rehman played up his links with the Taliban, and the Islamist coalition did well. In retrospect, that may have been his high point. The divide between the pro-Taliban leaders of yesterday and those of today was fully exposed by the insurrection at the Red Mosque in Islamabad, which began last January under the leadership of Abdul Rashid Ghazi and his brother. As the weeks and months passed, the rebels kidnapped a brothel madam, some police officers and, finally, six Chinese masseuses. They made a bonfire of CDs and DVDs and demanded that Musharraf implement Shariah. Defenders paced the outer walls of the mosque holding guns and sharpened garden tools.

Rehman tried to talk the Ghazi brothers out of their reckless adventure, but his influence inside the mosque was limited. "They are simply beyond me," he said at one point.

Abdul Rashid Ghazi and his entourage of Islamic militants finally clashed with state security forces in early July, but the real rebellion actually occurred in the preceding months, when Ghazi and his brother flouted efforts by Rehman and other religious elders to talk them down. Back in April, when I had asked Ghazi how he felt with the entire old guard turning against him, he looked more amused than worried. "Everywhere you look, you can see youngsters rejecting the old ones because old people do not like change," he said. "They are rigid." Before army commandos killed him in July, Ghazi promised that a government assault on the Red Mosque would be a blessing for the mujahedeen. His "martyrdom," he used to say, would further invigorate the jihadis and expedite an Islamic revolution in Pakistan.

Since Ghazi's death, hundreds of soldiers and policemen have died in suicide blasts or in gunfights against the Taliban. The capture of the soldiers in South Waziristan has perhaps been the worst of it. (In a Taliban-produced DVD circulating around Dera Ismail Khan, a teenager saws the head off a soldier while, in the background, three of his adolescent peers chant "Allahu akbar.") But the militants have not spared Pakistan's top spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (I.S.I.), which orchestrated the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan in the 1990s. In September, twin suicide blasts went off, and one ripped through a bus carrying I.S.I. employees to work in Rawalpindi, the military's garrison city near Islamabad, killing at least 25 people. The intelligence officer I met in Dera Ismail Khan, whose area of operations included the Taliban-ruled enclave of South Waziristan, maintains that his contacts with the militants were severed long ago. "We can hardly work there anymore," he told me. "The Taliban suspect everyone of spying. All of our sources have been slaughtered."

I asked Rehman, who used to refer to the Taliban as "our boys," if he still considered the Taliban, even those who might be firing rockets at his house, his boys. "Definitely," he replied. "But because of America's policies, they have gone to the extreme. I am trying to bring them back into the mainstream. We don't disagree with the mujahedeen's cause, but we differ over priorities. They prefer to fight, but I believe in politics."

Mushahid Hussain, secretary general of the pro-Musharraf faction of the Pakistan Muslim League, told me that no one can negotiate the politics of the North-West Frontier Province better than Rehman. "We know that we need a bearded, turbaned guy out there," Hussain told me. It is perhaps a measure of how inextricable Islamism and politics have become in Pakistan that even the United States would deal with an anti-American like Rehman. In September, he had the first meeting of his 30-year political career with an American ambassador. What did Rehman and Anne Patterson, the American envoy, discuss? "She urged me to form an electoral alliance with Benazir Bhutto and Musharraf," he told me a few days after the meeting. "I am not against it. But politically, because of the American presence in Afghanistan and rising extremism, it is a bit hard for us to afford." Plus, the fact that the Americans thought Bhutto could tackle the Taliban had simply baffled him. "She has no strategy in those areas, and nothing to do with those people," he said.

When asked if Patterson's meeting signaled a change in American attitudes, an embassy spokeswoman said it "reflects our approach to democratic politics in Pakistan" and was "part of a process of talking to all those who represent political movements in Pakistan, across the spectrum." The U.S. has given more than $5 billion to Pakistan in the past few years to fight Islamist militants, but recent reports suggest that the aid has not been effective. Late last month, Congress put restrictions on some military aid and called for the restoration of democratic rights.

Even after the Bhutto assassination, Rehman told me he would stay in the election — although, as he put it, "the reality is that this is complete anarchy, and no one can run a campaign."

Before his death at the end of the Red Mosque standoff in July, Abdul Rashid Ghazi was allies with a young cleric in the Swat Valley, in the North-West Frontier Province. The cleric's name is Maulana Fazlullah. For a year, Fazlullah trained his militia and amassed a following. Twice a day, he delivered a radio address, broadcast to tens of thousands of people in Swat, over his illegal station. He preached about the virtues of Shariah, the ills of female education and the honor of jihad and the Taliban. In retaliation for the assault on the Red Mosque, Fazlullah's militiamen and suicide bombers launched attacks on convoys and police stations throughout the Swat Valley.

When, in October, I asked Rehman if he had any control over Fazlullah, he said the negotiating efforts of the J.U.I. leader there, Qari Abdul Bais, were saving Fazlullah and the Pakistani Army from going to war. But when I met Bais, a septuagenarian with a cane, he offered this estimation of Fazlullah: "He is totally out of control." Fazlullah created a more difficult situation for Musharraf and the generals — and, in a different way, for local religious leaders — because his ambitions exceeded the mere creation of an Islamic emirate in Swat. In November, his men began conquering territory and taking over police stations in neighboring districts, pulling down Pakistani flags and raising their own. By late November, the Pakistani Army had had enough and mounted an immense offensive against Fazlullah and his men, a bloody battle that continued into late December. I was able to visit Fazlullah's compound (since destroyed) just before the military attacks began and get a sense of what a Taliban-controlled area in Pakistan would be like.

Fazlullah's base was a sprawling mosque and madrassa compound in the village of Imam Dehri, located across the Swat River from the city of Mingora. The entire Swat Valley is surrounded by mountains blanketed with pine forests. The river pours from the Hindu Kush Mountains and meanders through the valley, nourishing apple and persimmon orchards. During the summer, thousands of Pakistanis flock here for a break from the heat and humidity choking the lowlands. When I visited Swat in June, for example, still weeks before the Red Mosque assault began in Islamabad, I had trouble getting a room at the exclusive Serena Hotel. By the time I returned in October, I was the only guest. Almost immediately after arriving the second time around, I saw why: at the edge of town, Taliban rode around in flatbed trucks, pointing weapons in the air and ordering motorists to remove the tape decks from their cars. Fazlullah, like his Taliban predecessors in Afghanistan, deemed music — and anything that plays music — un-Islamic.

The following Friday, I went to Imam Dehri, where I met the commander of Fazlullah's militia, a man with glacier-blue eyes named Sirajuddin. (Fazlullah appeared briefly, but didn't stay long; he was observing aitekaaf, a meditation period that lasts 10 days at the end of Ramadan.) To get from Mingora to Imam Dehri, my Pashto interpreter and I boarded a small metal tram attached to a zip-line. Six other people piled in. We got a light push to get moving, and then soared over the river. Sirajuddin waited on the other side, and he led us through a crowd of Fazlullah's supporters. The P.A. system blasted prerecorded jihadi poems while Taliban walked about with assault rifles slung over their shoulders.

"We are struggling for the enforcement of Shariah," Sirajuddin told me inside a brick shed that was his office. "Twice, in 1994 and 1999, the government said it was committed to enforcing Shariah in this area, but it never did. The people here want Islam to be a way of life." He added: "We are Muslims, but our legal system is based on English laws. Our movement wants to replace the English system with an Islamic one."

Four Taliban sat in the room with us, watching me with dark, intent eyes. I asked one of them, a 32-year-old named Abdul Ghafoor, what he was fighting for. Islam? Revenge? "This is not personal revenge; this is our religious obligation," he told me, speaking Pashto through an interpreter. Ghafoor crouched on a low stool, a Kalashnikov resting on his lap. He said he was a recent graduate from the University of Peshawar with a master's degree in Islamic theology, and that he earned his living as a schoolteacher. Every day after school, and on holidays, he grabbed his gun and joined Fazlullah. He wore a long beard, a black turban, an ammunition vest stuffed with extra banana clips and pistols and Reebok high-tops with a Velcro strap. Messages crackled over the walkie-talkie attached to the collar of his vest. The Taliban were coordinating their movements.

Later, Ghafoor took me from Sirajuddin's office to a platform where some supposed criminals were scheduled to be lashed. About 15,000 men and boys, some sitting on picnic blankets, encircled the wooden platform, which was supported on drum barrels and had been erected by Fazlullah's group as a place for public punishments. The Taliban paraded three men, accused of aiding kidnappers, before the crowd. Fazlullah's mujahedeen had caught the kidnappers as they were shuttling two women out of Swat. The Taliban sent the women back home and arrested everyone involved with the crime. Now the youngest of the criminals, who appeared to be still in his teens, scaled the steps to the platform. He looked as if he might collapse, legs wobbling with fear, as hundreds of heavily armed Taliban spread out around him. I stood among them, waiting to see the boy receive 15 lashings — the appropriate Islamic punishment, according to Fazlullah.

The boy lay face-down on the platform. Taliban held his arms and legs so he wouldn't flop around. Another jihadi, clutching a thick, leather whip, roughly two feet long, wore a camouflage shalwar kameez and a ski mask over his face. Every time the whip crashed on the boy's back, the crowd called out the corresponding number of lashes, as if counting the final seconds of a basketball game. The teenager's body convulsed under the crack and thud of each lash; when he finally stood up, he was shaking and drenched in tears.

"This punishment is permitted in Islam," announced one of Fazlullah's deputies over a P.A. system fixed to a flatbed truck parked beside the platform. Along with the three accused men, who were lashed in turn, a dozen militants also stood on the platform, holding Kalashnikovs and rocket launchers. Another lay on his stomach on the roof of a nearby shed, his eyes lined up behind the sights of an automatic machine gun. Everyone knew that Fazlullah's decision to take the law into his own hands was in blatant defiance of the government's writ: the militants' job was to repel any sudden ambush by the Pakistani Army or paramilitary forces; the deputy on the P.A. system, meanwhile, had to persuade the people that the lashings accorded with Islamic law. "Even if there is no central Islamic government, these punishments are permitted in parts of the country if it contributes to maintaining peace," the deputy explained, speaking in Pashto. "We have no intention to occupy the government or for any political authority. This is only for peace and security."

After the lashings, thousands of people lined up to ride the tram back across the river. Ghafoor took us to Mingora by another route, through a cluster of villages loyal to Fazlullah. On the way, I asked Ghafoor what he thought about Maulana Fazlur Rehman. "He and his party deceived the public for votes, all in the name of Islam," Ghafoor said. Ghafoor voted for the M.M.A. in 2002, hoping that they would enforce Shariah as they had promised. "But Maulana Fazlur Rehman didn't even implement an Islamic system within himself," Ghafoor said. "He gets photographed with women, which is against the principles of Islam. And he failed to resolve the Jamia Hafsa crisis. He couldn't protect all the innocent people who died." Jamia Hafsa was the women's madrassa adjoining the Red Mosque.

We got into an S.U.V. and rode on a single-lane dirt road, lined with lush fields of cauliflower, apricot orchards and persimmon trees, their ends tipped with the bright orange fruit. We passed through a village made of mud-brick homes, and on one of the walls someone had chalked "Shariat ya Shahadat" ("Shariah or Martyrdom"). "I will never vote for the M.M.A. again," Ghafoor said, "and we will totally boycott the next election." Democracy, he added, was un-Islamic.

The Pakistani Army now claims to have killed hundreds of Taliban, and arrested hundreds more, in its Swat Valley operation. The army also says that local people in Swat greeted them with sweets, and that the homes of some top leaders, including Sirajuddin, had been destroyed. Ghafoor's phone line has been cut for weeks, as have those of others in the group — although Sirajuddin has made occasional calls to the press, as when he accepted responsibility for a suicide attack in late December.

When I met Rehman in Peshawar in the fall we sat outside on plastic lawn furniture in the shade of a large oak tree. He rubbed a strand of chunky, orange prayer beads, and we discussed the changing leadership in the borderlands of Pakistan. In the past five years, more than 150 pro-government maliks, or tribal elders, had been killed by the Taliban. Oftentimes, the Taliban dumped the bodies by the side of the road for passers-by to see, with a note, written in Pashto, pinned to the corpse's chest, damning the dead man as an American spy. "When the jihad in Afghanistan started," Rehman told me, "the maliks and the old tribal system in Afghanistan ended; a new leadership arose, based on jihad. Similar is the case here in the Tribal Areas. The old, tribal system is being relegated to the background, and a new leadership, composed of these young militants, has emerged." He added, "This is something natural."

Though Rehman describes the emergence of the local Taliban in evolutionary terms, he explains it as a result of a leadership crisis in Pakistan. He respects the secular-minded people who created Pakistan but insists that social and religious changes over the past two decades have made such leaders much less relevant: "We have to adjust to reality, and that demands new leaders with new visions."

I asked if he considered himself such a new leader with a new vision.

"I don't consider myself as someone extraordinary," Rehman said. "I have the same feelings as everyone else in the current age: if the weather is warm, everyone feels warm; if it is cold, everyone feels cold. The difference between me and other people is in our responsibilities." He took a long breath of the fresh, fall air, continued rubbing his prayer beads and leaned over the chair to spit. "That's why I am so careful, because my decisions can affect many, many people. I am trying to bring people back from the fire, not push them toward it." Rehman once seemed ready to introduce Taliban-style rule in Pakistan. Now he is trying to preserve democracy from being destroyed by ruthless militants. If he can't succeed, can anyone?

Nicholas Schmidle is a Pakistan-based writer and a fellow of the Institute of Current World Affairs. This is his first article for the magazine.

Pakistan' Plight by Tariq Ali

January, 14 2008By Tariq Ali
Source: The Nation

Tariq Ali's ZSpace Page
Join ZSpace


(11 January 2008) With Pervez Musharraf trying to cling to power whatever the cost, a farcical succession within the Pakistan People's Party, and continued US interference, Pakistan's dark night is far from over. A multidimensional charade is taking place in Pakistan, and it is not an edifying sight. Pervez Musharraf has discarded his uniform and is trying to cling to power, whatever the cost.

So far it has been high: the dismissal of the Supreme Court judges and their replacement by stooges; police brutality against a strong lawyers' movement protesting the military assault on the judiciary; and the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, who had returned to Pakistan as part of an ill-judged deal brokered by the Bush Administration and its British acolytes.

Add to this the sad spectacle of supposedly reformist, Western-backed politicians assembling like old family retainers at the feudal home of the slain leader and rubber-stamping her political will: Bhutto's husband, Asif Ali Zardari, has become stopgap supremo till her 19-year-old son, Bilawal, can replace his late mother as chairperson-for-life. This farcical succession occurred in a party that was born in 1967 out of the mass struggle of disenfranchised students, workers, professionals and peasants for democracy and, yes, socialism. That is why it was named the Pakistan People's Party. Its trajectory encapsulates the crisis of democratic politics in Pakistan: a party is publicly expropriated and corrupted by a single faction from an old family; its members are treated like serfs; its weak-kneed leaders told to either accept their new overlords or find another vehicle for their ambitions. Where can they go?

The PPP's major rival, the Pakistan Muslim League, is hardly better. It is in the grip of the Sharif brothers. Patronized by the military and the state, they became very rich, which helped them to maintain their party and support. After Nawaz Sharif fell out with Musharraf and was toppled in the 1999 coup, he sought the protection of the Saudi royal family. Sporting Wahhabi headgear, he returned home in November with their support. It's bad enough having semipermanent military rule, but when the alternatives are deeply flawed booty politicians, what hope is there for this benighted land?

The roots of the problem go back to soon after the founding of the state, when the military-bureaucratic leaders decided at an early stage (1950) to become a US satrapy: the Dulles brothers saw to it that the new ally was locked into a network of cold war alliances. Henceforth, US global priorities determined Pakistan's foreign and domestic policies. Whenever there was the threat of a democratic victory by parties pledging to withdraw Pakistan from US security arrangements, Foggy Bottom would appeal directly to the Pakistani army. The coups d'état of 1958 and 1977 were greenlighted by Washington, with disastrous results. Then there was the trial and execution--privately approved by Washington--of democratically elected Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Benazir's father, by dictator Muhammad Zia ul-Haq; the creation of local state-backed jihadi groups to "liberate" Afghanistan from the Soviets; and the brutalization of the country's political culture with public floggings and hangings of criminals as well as activists.

The ultimate consequences of the anti-Soviet jihad were America's turning a blind eye as General Zia hurriedly nuclearized the country, the attacks of 9/11 and the NATO occupation of Afghanistan, with the ensuing instability on Pakistan's northwest frontier. The post-cold war embargo designed to punish Pakistan for its possession of nuclear weapons proved ineffective, and all family tiffs were happily forgotten as the "war on terror" commenced. The balance sheet is dismal.

The instability in the border provinces is a direct result of the NATO occupation and war in Afghanistan, which has created a crisis of conscience inside the army. There is much unhappiness at being paid to kill fellow Muslims in the tribal areas that border Afghanistan. The arrogant and humiliating behavior of NATO soldiers has hardly helped matters in either country, and sending US troops to train the Pakistani military in counterinsurgency can only further inflame passions. Long-term stability in Afghanistan requires a regional agreement involving India, Russia, Iran and Pakistan and the withdrawal of all NATO troops.

As for Musharraf, he has failed as an effective US point man in Pakistan. The elections, now delayed until February 18, are likely to be fixed and will thus lack legitimacy. The general's failure to protect Benazir Bhutto has not gone down well in Washington. When Hillary Clinton and Joseph Biden cast doubt on the government's explanation for her killing, it's a sure sign that he could be heading for the dustbin.

There is a Pakistani solution to the current impasse: Musharraf's replacement by a less contentious figure, an all-party government to prepare for free elections, removal of all curbs on the media and reinstatement of the sacked Supreme Court judges so they can investigate Benazir Bhutto's murder without fear or favor. With the slow death of the PPP, the country also needs a genuine, radical democratic party that can respond to the social needs of the underprivileged majority and the expanding demands of civil society.

For its part, Washington should accept a self-denying ordinance: it should stop treating the Pakistani army as contract killers on a turbulent Afghan frontier, and it should refrain from encouraging military rule. This was never a panacea for the country's ills, and never can be. And Washington should encourage regional unity to solve political problems without resorting to force. Were it to do so, pigs would fly. Pakistan's dark night is far from over.






The Pakistan Conundrum

  Jan 16, 2008

By Scott Ritter

The assassination of former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto has prompted much instant analysis and Monday morning quarterbacking by observers of that volatile region.  Early assessments agree that public sentiment in Pakistan has turned decisively against both President Pervez Musharraf and the Islamic parties that oppose him (parties from which the assassins allegedly were recruited).  President Musharraf himself has given weight to such assessments by reaffirming Pakistani sovereignty (he says he would treat any unilateral American military incursion into the Northwest Frontier as an invasion which he would oppose by force) and by projecting his own personal political vulnerability (he says he expects opposition parties to make gains in the coming elections and if a newly empowered majority seeks to impeach him he will resign).

Musharraf's pro-American posturing and the material support Pakistan has provided in the so-called global war on terror have been decidedly unpopular among the Pakistani population.  Islamabad has always tried to tread lightly when it came to an American military presence on Pakistani soil.  The quick "victory" of the U.S.-led Northern Alliance over the Taliban and al-Qaida in Afghanistan allowed inconvenient American military bases in Pakistan to be transferred to the newly conquered territory inside Afghanistan.  However, continued resistance in Afghanistan from the Taliban and al-Qaida, which depend on support networks throughout the Northwest Frontier of Pakistan, has prompted the United States to pressure Pakistan's government to crack down, and even in some cases to allow direct action on Pakistani soil, either in the form of the CIA or a military intervention.

Musharraf has acted against pro-Taliban militants in the Northwest Frontier, but with negligible results.  Indeed, much of the Islamic militancy in Pakistan today has been stirred up by the regime's continued support of American-inspired operations in Pakistan.  Pervez Musharraf's recent statement opposing unilateral American military intervention in Pakistan sends a clear signal that the ongoing opposition in Pakistan to continued support of U.S. military activity targeting Pakistanis has resonated politically.

The political unrest created by Musharraf's support of the U.S. "war on terror" prompted the Pakistani dictator to seek stability by firing Pakistani Supreme Court justices he disagreed with and to suspend the constitution.  Both actions have left him vulnerable to impeachment if political opposition parties are able to assemble a viable majority in the Parliament in upcoming elections, expected in February.  Musharraf has indicated he will not be a political pawn in any resultant call for accountability.  The question remains whether he will resign and depart Pakistan as a political exile, or resign and reassert himself as dictator, or resign and throw his support behind a new military dictatorship which will enable him to remain in Pakistan as a behind-the-scenes power broker. 

Some would scoff at the notion that Musharraf would seek to reimpose military dictatorship in the face of a growing demand for democracy and the rule of law.  While Pakistan plays lip service to the notion of parliamentary democracy, the reality is that it is first and foremost a Muslim nation born more from a call for Islamic identity than a desire to embrace the Magna Carta-driven democracy of its colonial masters, the British. The secular nature of Musharraf's dictatorship disguises this.

Pakistan from its inception was supposed to bring together the Muslim populations of the former British Indian colony into a viable nation-state.  While many of those who oversaw the formation of the new governmental structure were moderate, even secular lawyers trained in the British tradition, the overwhelming population of what was to become Pakistan traced its loyalty to a system of local elders and religious figures who more often than not referred to sharia, or Islamic law, when pronouncing decisions of government.  This duality is reflected in the resolution passed by Pakistan's early leaders on the eve of what was to become the country's constitutional convention.  It proclaimed "[s]overeignty under the entire universe belongs to Allah Almighty alone" and characterized Islamic values as essential in any new government. 

But Pakistan is no homogeneous Islamic state.  Its roots are deeply seated in tribal, familial and ethnic realities that most non-Pakistani observers are ill-equipped to comprehend.  An illustration of this can be found in the fact that Benazir Bhutto, the martyred symbol of democratic reform, sat at the head of a political party, the PPP (Pakistan Peoples Party), which was born not from Pakistani society in general but rather from the ranks of the 700,000-strong Bhutto tribe.  The Bhuttos, an ethnic Sindhi group, possess an insularity that belies the image of democratic reform embraced by Benazir Bhutto herself.  An ongoing rift within the PPP over Bhutto's successor illustrates this:  Benazir's husband, Asif Ali Zardari, together with their son, Bilawal, has claimed the leadership of the party, citing a controversial and challenged will which emerged after Benazir Bhutto's assassination.  Neither Asif Ali Zardari nor Bilawal is considered to be part of the Bhutto tribe, because Zardari is of Baluchi heritage and the son is traditionally linked to the family tree of the father.  It is not the history of corruption that surrounds Zardari or the inexperience of Bilawal (a student in the UK) that the Bhutto tribe finds objectionable but simply the fact that a political party founded by and for the Bhuttos is now in the hands of someone outside the tribe.

Pakistan's population of 170 million people is made up of three major ethnic groups, the Punjabi, Pashtun and Sindhi, which account for some 44 percent, 16 percent and 14 percent of the population, respectively.  Indian Muslim immigrants, or Mujahirs, make up about 8 percent of the population, while the Baluchi make up 4 percent.  The remaining population is divided among other minorities, including the Kasmiri and the various tribes of Pakistan's Northwest Frontier.  There are also some 3 million Afghan refugees still residing in Pakistan today, a tragic remnant from the time of the Soviet invasion and occupation of that land.  Pakistan's historical roots led in part to three major wars (in 1948, 1965 and 1971) and several skirmishes between Pakistan and India.  The historical turmoil surrounding the creation of Pakistan, as well as the inconsistent ability of its federal system to hold together the wide variety of ethnic and religious groups brought together to form the country, created a system imbued with a spirit of distrust between the various ethnicities.  The animosities caused by this distrust are manifest in Pakistan's special intelligence service, which was formed to deal with not only threats from abroad but threats from within.  The highly politicized nature of this intelligence service, the Inter-Services Intelligence Agency, or ISI, has only caused further intrigue and uncertainty for the nation.

The ISI played an instrumental role in using Islam as a tool during its struggle against India, as well as its opposition to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.  The Makhtab al-Khidamat, or MAK, was one of many Islamic organizations which were funded and supported by the ISI.  Operating out of bases inside Pakistan, the MAK was founded in 1984 by Abdullah Yussuf Azzam, a Palestinian Islamic scholar and theologian, and a Saudi follower, Osama bin Laden.  Using money provided by bin Laden, and working closely with the Pakistani ISI, Azzam and the MAK established a base of operations in the Northwest Frontier city of Peshawar, a scant 15 miles from the historic Khyber Pass into Afghanistan.  Azzam and the MAK put into operation a system of logistics and communication between the Northwest Frontier and Afghanistan which provided material and financial support to the Afghan mujahedeen fighting the Soviet army.  The MAK was also able to funnel a few Arab mujahedeen into Afghanistan, although this number never rose above a few hundred.  With the assassination of Azzam in 1989, the leadership of the MAK was transferred to Osama bin Laden, who in 1988 formed an alliance with the head of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Ayman al-Zawahiri, that today is known as al-Qaida.

The links between bin Laden and the Pakistani ISI were deep.  The MAK lines of communication between Peshawar and Afghanistan, established during the struggle against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, were continued and strengthened during the 1990s, this time as part of the al-Qaida organization, with the full knowledge and support of the ISI.  Pakistan had been taken aback by the violent infighting between the various Afghan mujahedeen forces in the aftermath of the Soviet defeat and withdrawal in 1989.  In an effort to achieve stability in Afghanistan, the ISI supported the rise of the Taliban, and went along with the support of the Taliban by the Arab mujahedeen of bin Laden's al-Qaida.  Pakistan was one of only three nations to recognize the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan.

The al-Qaida-Taliban connection was also seen by the ISI as a means of maintaining contacts with Saudi and other Gulf Arab sources of funds needed not only to sustain stability inside Afghanistan but to promote instability inside Indian-occupied Kashmir.  Training camps set up by al-Qaida in Afghanistan to recruit and prepare foreign mujahedeen for operations worldwide were supported by the ISI as a means of training covert operatives for activity in Kashmir.  Al-Qaida and its Arab funders returned the favor by assisting the ISI in establishing mirror-image facilities inside Pakistan which were used to train paramilitary forces for operations in Kashmir.  In 1999 Pakistan sent a large force of paramilitary operatives across the border into Kashmir disguised as Kashmiri rebels.  This gambit failed, and in doing so exposed the reality that the ISI was heavily involved in training Islamist extremists to do its bidding, in Kashmir as well as Afghanistan.

The support provided by the ISI to bin Laden was extensive.  When American cruise missiles struck al-Qaida training camps in Afghanistan in 1998, in retaliation for the terror bombings carried out against the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, among the casualties were Pakistani ISI agents working with al-Qaida.  After the terror attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, Pakistan was forced to reconsider its public support of the Taliban.  The ISI made an effort to convince the Taliban to turn Osama bin Laden over to a neutral third party so he could be tried for the 9/11 attacks, but this offer was rebuked by the Taliban leadership.  The collapse of the Taliban as a military force was so rapid in the fall and winter of 2001 that when al-Qaida forces were surrounded in the northern Afghan city of Konduz, a large number of ISI agents and operatives were trapped with them.  One of the secret annals of the Afghan war is the story of how the Pakistani government negotiated with the United States to permit the evacuation by air of several hundred Pakistani ISI personnel who had been working with al-Qaida in Afghanistan.  It is alleged that in addition to the Pakistani evacuees, numerous high-level al-Qaida fighters were likewise withdrawn, in particular those with intimate knowledge of the ISI activities involving Kashmir and the Central Asian republics.

The ISI also plays an important role in the internal politics of Pakistan, monitoring various ethnic and tribal groups who are deemed to be questionable in terms of their absolute loyalty to Pakistan, or at least the Pakistan supported by the ISI.  In doing so, the ISI has established relationships with all the major tribal and ethnic groups, and is thus able to play one off against the other in a giant game of divide and conquer.  One of the targets of the ISI was, and is, the PPP, the party of Benazir Bhutto.  The intelligence agency had made use of its considerable links with the Islamist elements of Pakistan's Northwest Frontier to generate an Islamic opposition to the return to power of Benazir Bhutto, and there is good reason to believe that the ISI was involved, either directly or indirectly, in her assassination.

The unfortunate reality of Pakistan today is that it is a barely functioning nation-state.  Federalism, designed to bring together a disparate band of ethnic groups and religious movements, is failing.  Democracy, the dream of Western-trained lawyers, is foreign to the majority of the population, which largely continues to defer to tribal elders and religious leaders.  The nefarious activities of the Pakistani ISI only highlight the reality that Pakistan, today, is not only an untrustworthy member of the erstwhile "global coalition against terrorism" but actually a deep-rooted supporter and instigator of the very violence the United States has sworn to oppose since 9/11.  Far from being a close ally, the truth is that, if anything, Pakistan is the personification of the enemy we have supposedly pledged to defeat.

Does this mean that the appropriate policy direction of the United States should be to wage war against Pakistan, as we have against the Taliban in Afghanistan?  Absolutely not.  The experience of Afghanistan shows that without a doubt the policies embraced by the Bush administration in pursuing its war on terror were fundamentally flawed.  In the cause-and-effect world of reality, as opposed to the never-never land of neoconservative fantasy, any continued push against Pakistan in the name of the war on terror would be extremely counterproductive.  Let's not forget that Pakistan has the bomb.

The fact of the matter is that the chief enemy in America's fight against terrorism, Osama bin Laden, is a mere propaganda source who is given more legitimacy the more we pursue him.  The continued instability in Afghanistan caused by the ongoing American and NATO occupation is the source of much of Pakistan's current problems.  If we truly want to eliminate bin Laden, we would do well to withdraw from Afghanistan and work with Iran, Pakistan and the former Soviet Central Asian republics, as well as the Taliban, to bring a sense of normalcy back to this tortured country.  In doing so, it would become self-evident to all parties that any continued role on the part of bin Laden would be self-defeating, and he would be dealt with appropriately by those best equipped to do so.

This, of course, is the last policy direction being pursued by any of the candidates seeking election to the office of president of the United States.  The bravado of the respective candidates' "hunt Osama down until he is brought to justice" rhetoric is as empty as their promises to seek stability inside Pakistan, for the two are inherently contradictory policy directions.  To pursue one is to fail in the other.  But, as has been the case with Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran beforehand, one would be foolish to believe that the people of the United States, let alone those they elect to higher office, would deign to formulate policy with the reality of a given region and not the American domestic political dynamic in mind.  Today, in the Middle East and Southwest Asia, America flounders in a sea of uncertainty and sorrow.  Sadly, there is no good reason to believe that any future captain of our ship of state will be any more successful in navigating the challenges of the Pakistan conundrum.

http://www.truthdig.com/report/item/20080116_the_pakistan_conundrum/

More Thoughts on the Serena Bombing: Back to the Light Footprint; Democracy in Pakistan

by Barnett R. Rubin

I had a few conversations that led me to the following thoughts about the Serena bombing:

Whatever happens next, this is a major decision point for everyone concerned in Afghanistan. Such operations will continue. Even if the vast majority do not succeed, the result will be a mix of the following:

      1. Many if not most of the civilian foreign expatriates currently involved in the delivery of aid or other activities in Afghanistan will leave.
      2. Most of the rest will be concentrated into a Forbidden City like the Green Zone in Baghdad. The U.S. Embassy is already such a compound, and the area around it in Wazir Akbar Khan is already so fortified that it might not take much more to turn that and the adjacent areas of Shahr-i Naw (palace, main ministries, UN offices, embassies) into such a zone.

This is happening at the same time that it is necessary to increase development assistance, as the absorption capacity of the Afghan government and society is finally starting to increase. These alternatives are unacceptable. They would make aid even more wasteful and out of touch than it is now.

The alternative is to go back to the original much misunderstood idea of the "light footprint." People say that Lakhdar Brahimi's idea of the light footprint has failed. They even confuse the idea with Donald Rumsfeld's idea of "economy of force." But there has never been a light footprint in Afghanistan. Brahimi imagined in the fall of 2001 that most of the aid to Afghanistan would be delivered through UN agencies, as it was in East Timor. As Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the UN, he advocated a light footprint for those agencies, so as to channel most of the aid to building up the capacity and legitimacy of the Afghan government rather than into parallel structures that would suck all the talent and money away.

That never happened. The SRSG could no t control the agencies. But even that hardly mattered. Most of the aid was not delivered by UN agencies. It was delivered by an army of foreign contractors, consultants, and NGOs working for bilateral donors (that's aid-speak for "countries," like the US). And all those foreigners need security that NATO, the Coalition, and the Afghan government cannot provide: hence the proliferation of foreign owned-private security contractors -- and the Afghan private security contractors that they have spawned as their subcontractors, many of which are composed of supposedly demobilized militias.

I'm not attacking all those aid workers. I'm one of them. The point is not about our individual merits -- there are saints and sinners among us. God knows, I am probably a more legitimate target for the Taliban than that Filippina woman they killed in the gym. But collectively we have generated an infrastructure serving only our needs that dwarfs the infrastructure provided for Afghans. This infrastructure -- of which the Serena Hotel is the flagship -- is the most visible part of the aid system to Afghans. Projects may mature in a few (or many) years, but right now Afghans see the guest houses, bars, restaurants, armored cars, checkpoints, hotels, hostile unaccountable gunmen, brothels, videos, CDs, cable television, Internet cafes with access to pornography, ethnic Russian waitresses from Kyrgyzstan in Italian restaurants owned by members of the former royal family and patronized by U.S. private security guards with their Chinese girlfriends and Afghan TV moguls, and skyrocketing prices for real estate, food, and fuel, traffic jams caused by the proliferation of vehicles and exacerbated by "security measures" every time a foreign or Afghan official leaves the office -- I could go on, but the S erena is a symbol of all that.

Is there a way to make this danger into an opportunity? The Afghan government from the beginning has asked for more aid to go through the Afghan government budget, more contracts to be given to Afghan firms. The international reply has always been "lack of capacity," though I am not sure which is a more serious problem: Afghans' lack of capacity to do what foreigners require of them to get aid, or foreigners' lack of capacity to build meaningful skills or deliver aid in a way that Afghans perceive as effective.

We don't have the luxury of waiting around for some mythical "capacity building" programs that the "international community" apparently lacks the capacity to conceive or run (my apologies in advance to the exceptions -- please don't flood me with emails about how your program works -- I know some of them do). Do we want to support the Afghanistan that actually exists, or are we waiting for a new Afghanistan of our imagination to a ppear out of the mists of the Hindu Kush and deserve our aid? (Of course Afghans are also waiting for the superpowers and aid donors of their imagination to materialize, but it turns out that in reality -- well, see above.)

As far as I know, all this aid is not there because of anybody's generosity, though Afghans are required to say so from time to time. Did the US and other donors suddenly develop a bad case of generosity after September 11? I tried that argument from time to time during 1992-2001, but it didn't work. The US and others are in Afghanistan for their national security interests. So we can't just pack up and walk away if the Afghans don't conform to our desires. Sometimes I wish the Afghan government would keep that more firmly in mind.

It is possible -- though not necessarily so -- that these interests will coincide with that of many Afghans for a while. That's the question Afghans are asking: are the foreigners here to help us as well as themselves, or to help only themselves, even at our expense? That's the political question at the heart of counter-narcotics policy. That is the political question at the heart of disputes over civilian casualties, status of forces agreements, detainees, and how aid is delivered.

In fact it's the dispute that started the whole thing. Remember, Bin Laden stated on October 7, 2001, that the international state system (symbolized by the Treaty of Lausanne, to which he referred as the start of 80 years of humiliation) was a source of oppression to Muslims. He cited lots of examples. Muslims don't want to believe him. Whatever they have suffered or think they have suffered in this system, most don't see Bin Laden (or the Taliban) offering an alternative to modern education, science, health care, development, legalit y, and so on.

But they have to ask themselves -- what is the alternative the international system is actually offering us? For citizens of the UAE -- not so bad! For Afghans? They don't want more bombings, killings, executions, torture, corruption, invasions, ignorance, poverty, disease.... When I visited Afghanistan under the Taliban in 1998 people quietly let me know how frustrated they were. In the Pashtun areas, at least, people felt a degree of personal security as long as they obeyed the Taliban, but they were bitter about their poverty and lack of development and freedom. The universal strength of that feeling was the most lasting impression of that visit. Everything I have seen since has confirmed and reconfirmed it. But it has also confirmed and reconfirmed that Afghans are losing faith that they are actually being offered a share of what they thin k the "international community" has to offer.

I don't have a blueprint on my hard drive on in a cache somewhere. But the Serena bombing is a sign that unless Afghans are really in charge of their country, it will not be rebuilt. I know that some plans are out there. It's time to take a new look at them. Are they unrealistic? Maybe. But what is definitely unrealistic is thinking we can succeed with the approach we have used so far.

Now for Pakistan: the Afghan NDS says that the attackers were trained and equipped by networks based in Pakistan. That's not much of a surprise. As I mentioned in an earlier blog post, the UN already published a report on suicide bombings in Afghanistan, showing that they were organized, funded, and planned in the Tribal Agencies of Pakistan. Pakistan's main response (always proactive) was that its UN representative called the UN Secretary General and demanded that the report be tak en off the website.

But I don't want to "attack Pakistan" (more emails). Pakistanis are asking similar questions: is the War on Terror making us more or less secure? Is it a common interest we have with the Americans or something imposed on us against our interest? Right now, there is an unbridgeable gap in Pakistan between the population's perception of security threats and the military government's doctrine of security threats, conforming to Washington's.

According to poll data, most Pakistanis seem to see the Pakistani military as the most immediate threat to their security. Nawaz Sharif told a cheering crowd the other day that a government supinely following the Americans' War on Terror had "drowned the country in blood." He was referring to the military offensives in the tribal territories and the attack on the Red Mosque in Islamabad last summe r. Does his audience want to be ruled by Taliban and Usama Bin Laden? I haven't interviewed them, but I will hazard a guess: no they don't. But right now that is a secondary threat to them. Telling them they have to be for us or against us will only convince them that they are against us.

Conclusion: until Pakistan develops a legitimate political elite with a reasonable consensus about the national interest and national security, Pakistan will not be a "reliable ally in the war on terror." Why are the supporters of Benazir Bhutto more hostile to the military government than to the militant groups that probably killed her? Because they know that the military government used US aid to nurture those same militant groups and their civilian political allies in order to impose its own dictatorship. Reversing that calculus is the single most important task for sec urity in both Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Now people will ask me how to do it. I have some ideas ... I'd like to hear some others. One hint: missiles, Drones, commando raids, and more military rule in Pakistan are not the preferred options.


<http://icga.blogspot.com/2008 /01/more-thoughts-on-serena-bombing-back-to.html>
__._